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IN  1950 THE  RATE  of net national saving  in the United States was  12.3 
percent. In 1994 it was only 3.5 percent. ' The difference in these saving 
rates is illustrative of a dramatic long-term decline in U.S.  saving.  The 
U.S.  saving rate averaged 9. 1 percent per year in the 1950s and 1960s, 
8.5 percent in the 1970s,  4.7  percent in the 1980s,  and just 2.7  percent 
in the first five years of the 1990s.2 
The decline  in saving  in the United States has been associated  with 
an equally  dramatic decline  in domestic  investment.  Since  1990,  net 
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1.  The net national saving  rate is defined as net national product less  national con- 
sumption (household  consumption  plus government purchases),  divided by net national 
product. The  National  Income  and Product Account  (NIPA)  data used  in the body  of 
this paper do not incorporate recently  revised NIPA data for the years starting in 1959. 
2.  The recently released revised NIPA data also show a dramatic decline  in the U.S. 
net national  saving  rate.  For example,  during the  1960s  the saving  rate based  on  the 
revised data averaged  12.1  percent compared with 4.6  percent during the period  1990- 
95.  Saving  rates  in  the  revised  data  are  higher  than  in  the  unrevised  data  because 
government consumption  has been redefined to exclude  government purchases of dura- 
bles, but to include the imputed rent on the stock of government durables. The Commerce 
Department appears, however,  to be understating this imputed rent because  its measure 
includes only the depreciation  on the stock of government durables. 
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domestic  investment has averaged 3.6 percent per year, compared with 
8.2  percent in the  1950s,  7.9  percent in the 1960s and 1970s,  and 6.1 
percent in the  1980s.  The low rate of domestic  investment  appears to 
have  limited  growth  in  labor  productivity  and,  consequently,  real 
wages.  Since  1979,  labor productivity has grown at less  than half the 
rate observed  between  1950  and  1979,  and total  real  compensation 
(wages  plus fringe benefits) per hour has grown at only one-seventh  its 
previously  observed  rate. 
This paper develops  a unique cohort data set to study the decline  in 
U.S.  saving.  It focuses  on four periods for which Consumer Expendi- 
ture Surveys  (CEX)  are available:  1960-61,  1972-73,  1984-86,  and 
1987-90.  These  and a host of other microeconomic  surveys are com- 
bined with National Income and Product Account (NIPA) data and other 
aggregates  to  form  measures  of  cohort-specific  consumption  and re- 
sources.  The benchmarking of our cohort data set to NIPA aggregates 
ensures  that our findings relate directly  to the decline  in net national 
saving measured by these aggregates. 
We  use  our cohort  data within  a  simple  life  cycle  framework  to 
decompose  the postwar change  in U.S.  saving  in terms of changes  in 
the following  factors: the intergenerational distribution of  resources, 
cohort-specific  consumption  propensities,  the rate of  government 
spending  on goods  and services,  and demographics.  Our findings are 
striking. Most of the decline in U.S.  saving can be traced to two factors. 
First,  the government's  redistribution of  resources  toward older gen- 
erations  with  high  consumption  propensities  from younger  ones,  in- 
cluding those not yet born, with low or zero consumption propensities. 
Second,  a dramatic rise in the consumption propensities of older Amer- 
icans.  lThe form of  government  transfers to the elderly-the  fact that 
they are annuitized and, in the case of health care, made in kind-may 
help  to explain  the rise  in the elderly's  spending rate. For the young 
and middle-aged,  the findings are different. The consumption propens- 
ities  of  most  young  generations  have  declined  slightly  or remained 
constant over time,  and this has bolstered U.S.  saving. 
The next two sections of this paper provide a brief discussion of 
related  research  and present  some  stylized  facts  about recent  trends 
in  U.S.  saving  and consumption.  We  then  describe  our method  for 
decomposing  changes  in national saving.  We discuss data construction 
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and present our findings.  We next relate the increase in the propensity 
of the elderly  to consume  to the increase  in the annuitization of their 
resources recently documented by Alan Auerbach, Laurence Kotlikoff, 
and David  Weil  and Auerbach and others.3 We  address a number of 
questions  about the reliability  of our findings and examine  the paper's 
implications  for  future  rates  of  U.S.  saving.  We  conclude  with  a 
summary. 
Related Studies 
Several recent studies of U.S.  saving focus  on personal saving,  de- 
fined as saving out of disposable income.  Lawrence Summers and Chris 
Carroll suggest  that younger  cohorts may be hoping  to rely on social 
security in their retirement and are, in consequence,  saving too little on 
their own.  In contrast,  Barry Bosworth,  Gary Burtless,  and John Sa- 
belhaus compare personal saving rates in the 1960s,  1970s,  and 1980s 
and conclude  that all  age  groups  are now  saving  at lower  rates than 
used to be the case.  Orazio Attanasio  reaches  a third conclusion.  He 
places the blame for current low levels  of personal saving on the failure 
of  a particular subset of cohorts to save,  namely,  those born between 
1925 and 1939.' 
The studies by Bosworth,  Burtless,  and Sabelhaus and by Attanasio 
use consumer  expenditure  data that directly  cover  only  80 percent of 
aggregate consumption.  Although  Bosworth and his coauthors impute 
some  missing  consumption  components,  they  ignore  health  care,  as 
does  Attanasio.  This  is  a significant  omission.  Health care is a large 
and growing component of national consumption. Moreover, as medical 
consumption  has grown  as a share of  output,  so too has overall  con- 
sumption,  suggesting  that medical consumption,  or at least its method 
of  finance,  has  played  a key  role  in the decline  in the U.S.  rate of 
saving. 
Even were all the studies of personal saving in agreement,  it would 
be hard to assess  their implications  for national saving.  From a theo- 
retical perspective,  personal saving bears no necessary  relationship to 
3.  Auerbach,  Kotlikoff,  and Weil  (1992);  Auerbach and others (1995). 
4.  Summers and Carroll (1987);  Bosworth,  Burtless,  and Sabelhaus  (1991);  Attan- 
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national saving.  This point can be understood by considering  the stan- 
dard life  cycle  model  under certainty.  According  to  this  model,  the 
appropriate measure  of  household  saving  is  the propensity  of  house- 
holds  to consume  out of  the present value of their remaining lifetime 
resources.  This  propensity  will  be  invariant to  present-value  neutral 
changes  in the timing  of  after-tax income  flows,  each  of  which  will 
produce a different value of personal saving. 
For example,  an increase in households'  current social security taxes 
that  is  offset,  in  present  value,  by  higher  projected  social  security 
benefits  will  leave  their consumption  and,  thus,  national  saving  un- 
changed,  but lower their personal saving.  The postwar period has wit- 
nessed  an enormous  growth  in  social  security  and other government 
transfer programs.  Hence  changes  over time  in U.S.  personal  saving 
rates may simply reflect the life cycle  pattern of these tax and transfer 
programs, rather than some underlying change in household consump- 
tion and saving behavior. 
The problem with studying national saving through personal saving 
is  actually  deeper  than this  discussion  suggests  because  the tax  and 
transfer labels  of  government  receipts  and expenditure  programs are 
not unique.5 Assuming  that agents are rational, the same fiscal policy 
can  be  classified  in  countless  ways  without  making  a difference  to 
economic  outcomes,  including national saving.  But each classification 
will  result  in  a different  measure  of  personal  saving.  For example, 
suppose that the U.S.  government had historically  classified  social  se- 
curity contributions  as loans  to the government  rather than as taxes, 
and current and past social  security benefit payments as the repayment 
of past loans plus an old age tax rather than as transfer payments.6 That 
would  have  produced  an entirely  different  reported path of  personal 
saving during the postwar period, but it would not have altered national 
saving,  assuming  rational consumption  and saving behavior.  In 1993, 
as an example,  the personal saving rate would have been almost twice 
as large as the rate reported. 
5.  See,  for example,  Kotlikoff  (1993). 
6.  Such  reclassification  is not merely  a hypothetical  possibility.  The  so-called  pri- 
vatization  of  the Chilean  social  security  system  amounts,  in large part, to classifying 
workers'  social  security  contributions  as  loans,  rather than taxes.  Under the Chilean 
"reform,"  workers contribute to pension  funds.  But the pension  funds then lend most 
of these funds to the government,  which uses them to make benefit payments to current 
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Studies that focus directly on household consumption and, by impli- 
cation,  on national saving are few and far between.  The work of David 
Cutler  and  others  is  one  example.7  This  study  employs  an  infinite- 
horizon model to study the response  of household  consumption  to de- 
mographic  change.  Its  findings  suggest  that high  rates of  household 
consumption  and low rates of national saving reflect households'  pro- 
jections  of higher future per capita income levels as a result of the aging 
of the U.S.  population.  There are two major problems with this analy- 
sis,  however.  First, the assumed intergenerational altruism underlying 
the infinite-horizon model is strongly rejected by household and cohort 
panel  data.8 Second,  the  study's  results  are highly  sensitive  to  the 
authors' assumption about the initial position  of the economy. 
Michael Boskin  and Lawrence Lau estimate an aggregate consump- 
tion function,  taking into account aggregation over different cohorts.9 
Their results suggest  that a decline  in saving by generations born after 
the Great Depression  has been largely responsible  for the postwar de- 
cline in U.S.  saving-a  finding at odds with those reported here. How- 
ever,  they  find that the  age  distribution of  resources  is  an important 
determinant of aggregate consumption-a  finding consistent with those 
reported here. 
The Postwar Decline in U.S. Saving: Some Stylized Facts 
Table  1 reports average values of the net national saving rate for the 
1950s,  1960s,  1970s,  1980s,  and the first four years of the 1990s.  The 
net national saving  rate is defined as (Y  -  C  -  G)/Y, where Y refers 
to net national product (NNP),  C to household  consumption,  and G to 
government spending (purchases of goods and services).  The table also 
reports rates of government and household consumption out of output, 
GIY and CIY, respectively.  In addition,  the table reports our preferred 
measure of private sector saving,  which we call the household  saving 
rate. This is defined as (Y  -  G -  C)/(Y  -  G); that is, the share saved 
of  the  output  left  to  the  household  sector  after the  government  has 
7.  Cutler and others ( 1990). 
8.  See  Altonji,  Hayashi,  and Kotlikoff  (1992,  1995),  Abel  and Kotlikoff  (1994), 
and Hayashi,  Altonji,  and Kotlikoff  (1996). 
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Table 1. Saving and Spending  Rates 
Percent 
Net national  Government  Household  Household 
saving  spending  consumption  saving 
Period  rate  rate  rate  rate 
1950-59  9.1  21.0  69.9  11.5 
1960-69  9.1  22.1  68.8  11.7 
1970-79  8.5  21.4  70.1  10.8 
1980-89  4.7  21.3  74.0  5.9 
1990-94  2.7  20.7  76.6  3.4 
Source: Authors' calculations from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). 
consumed.  Unlike  the personal  saving rate, the household  saving rate 
is not affected by present-value neutral changes in the timing of income 
flows.  Nor is it altered by changes  in the classification  of government 
receipts and expenditures,  assuming that agents are rational and are not 
deceived  by the government's  choice  of language. 
As table  1 indicates,  government spending has not been responsible 
for reducing the rate of national saving.  Indeed, the rate of government 
spending,  GIY, has declined since the 1960s. Furthermore, in the 1990s 
government spending has averaged just 20.7  percent of output-as  low 
a  rate  as  any  observed  in  the  five  periods  considered.  The  rate  of 
household  consumption,  on the other hand, rose from 69.9  percent of 
output in the  1950s to 76.6  percent in the early  1990s.  '0 This increased 
rate of household consumption is associated with a decline in the house- 
hold  saving  rate from  11 .5 percent in the  1950s to 3.4  percent in the 
1990s. 
Table 2 considers  the role of health care spending in the growth of 
household  spending.  It shows  that medical  expenditures  (MIY) have 
increased from 3.9  percent of NNP in the  1950s to  12.8 percent in the 
1990s. In the 1950s health care spending represented less than 6 percent 
of  household  consumption.  In  the  1990s  to  date  it  has  represented 
almost  17 percent.  The  increase  in  the  rate of  medical  spending  is 
associated  with  only  a  modest  reduction  in  the  rate of  nonmedical 
spending.  In the 1950s nonmedical consumption averaged 66.0  percent 
10.  The rise in the rate of household consumption began in the 1970s. The household 
consumption  rate rose  by  1.6  percentage  points  between  the early  1970s  and the  late 
1970s  (that is,  from  1970-74  to  1975-79),  by  2.1  percentage  points  between  the late 
1970s  and  the  early  1980s,  by  2.0  percentage  points  between  the  early  1980s  and 
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Table 2. Household  and Medical  Consumption  Rates 
Percent 
Household  Medical 
Period  consumption rate  consumption rate 
1950-59  69.9  3.9 
1960-69  68.8  5.2 
1970-79  70.1  7.3 
1980-89  74.0  10.1 
1990-93  76.6  12.8 
Source: Authors' calculations from the NIPA. 
of NNP.  In the 1990s it has averaged 63.8  percent. Thus, although the 
rate of medical consumption has risen by 8.9 percentage points between 
the 1950s and 1990s,  the rate of nonmedical consumption has fallen by 
only 2.2  percentage points. 
Decomposing  the  Changes  in National  Saving 
We  adopt  the  no  bequest,  life  cycle  model  under certainty  as  an 
initial  framework  for  decomposing  the  postwar  changes  in  national 
saving.  In so  doing,  we  do not belittle  other determinants of  saving, 
such as uncertainty and the desire to bequeath. Rather, we believe  that 
this model is a useful  starting point. Our analysis relates cohorts'  con- 
sumption to their resources.  In the base case,  resources  refers to net 
wealth plus the actuarial present value of future nonasset pretax income, 
minus the actuarial present value of net taxes (taxes paid less  transfer 
payments received).  " 
The base case assumes that individuals correctly foresee their future 
resource  streams  (pretax  nonasset  income,  taxes,  and transfer pay- 
ments)  through  1993  and form projections  of  these  variables  for the 
years after  1993.  We  also  present results based on the assumption  of 
myopic  expectations.  Under myopic  expectations,  individuals  are as- 
sumed to extrapolate  current age-  and sex-specific  levels  of  nonasset 
incomes,  taxes,  and transfers into the future on the basis  of  recently 
observed rates of productivity growth. 
11.  Discounting  is at a constant real interest rate. The "actuarial"  value of income, 
taxes,  and transfers received  or paid in future years is that discounted by the probability 
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Our results can also be considered from the perspective of a life cycle 
model with uncertainty,  in which expected,  rather than actual realized 
resources,  determine consumption.  Realized  future income,  taxes,  and 
transfers represent an unbiased estimate of the ex ante expected  values 
of these resource streams,  since they differ from their expected  values 
by a mean-zero  expectation  error. If the expectation  error in total re- 
sources  is  small,  then the use  of realized  future resources rather than 
expected  future resources,  the theoretically  more appropriate resource 
measure, will make little difference  to our results. Note that the expec- 
tation error in total resources could be small even if expectation  errors 
with  respect  to  particular components  of  resources  were  large.  The 
reason is that these expectation errors may be offsetting. For example, the 
introduction and growth of medicare after 1965 may not have been ex- 
pected by the young cohorts that were making consumption decisions in 
the early 1960s. But, presumably, the future slowdown in the growth of 
their real wages  was also unanticipated. This unexpected decline in the 
human capital component of their resources may have offset much of the 
unexpected increase in the present value of their medicare benefits. 
Our interest is in the net national saving rate, which at time t is given 
by 
(1) 
St  C  G , 
yt  Y,  Y,' 
where St stands for net national saving. 
In the standard life cycle  model with certainty and homothetic pref- 
erences,  each cohort's  consumption is proportional to the present value 
of its remaining lifetime resources ("resources,"  for short). We denote 
the per capita resources  of the cohort aged i at time t as ri,. This is the 
sum of  the cohort's  per capita net wealth,  nwi,, its per capita present 
value of future labor earnings (human wealth),  hwi,, its per capita pres- 
ent value of private and government employee pension benefits (pension 
wealth),  pwi,,  less  its per capita present value  of future tax payments 
net of the per capita present value of future transfer payments received 
(the generational  account),  gai,. 
Since  our empirical  analysis  attributes all consumption  to adult co- 
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tion  at time  t as the  sum of  consumption  of  individual  cohorts  aged 
eighteen  through one hundred;'2 that is,  as 
100 
(2)  C,  ait rit  Pit, 
i=  ,8 
where i indexes  age,  a-i, stands for the average propensity to consume 
of i-year-olds  at time t, and Pi, stands for the number of i-year-olds  at 
time t. We note for future reference  that a-i, =  ci,lrt,, where ci, is the 
average level  of consumption  of those aged i at time t. 
Our goal is to decompose changes over time in the net national saving 
rate into changes in the rate of government spending, G,/Y,, and changes 
in the determinants of the rate of household spending, C,/Y,. These deter- 
minants are clarified by expressing the rate of household spending as 
(3)  C-  (  ti' 
where R, stands for the total value of resources of  living generations at 
time t (that is, R,  Ejritpit)  =P,  stands for the total population at time t, 
and r, stands for the resources per capita of living generations at time t. 
According  to equation 3, changes over time in the rate of household 
consumption can be traced to changes over time in four factors: cohort- 
specific  propensities  to consume  ((x;,), the  shape of  the age-resource 
profile (ri,/r,),  the age-composition  of the population  (Pj,/P,),  and the 
resources-to-output  ratio,  that is,  the  ratio  of  the  total  resources  of 
current generations  to current output (R,lY,). 
In our empirical analysis we compute the values of five factors-the 
four above  and government  spending-for  each of the periods  1960- 
61,  1972-73,  1984-86,  and 1987-90.  We then consider  how the na- 
tional saving rate in each of these periods would have differed had one 
of the five  factors  not taken its actual value  but, instead,  a value  ob- 
served in another period. 
This decomposition  of changes in life cycle  saving into those due to 
changes  in demographics,  saving  behavior,  and age-resource  profiles 
12.  Cohorts over the age of one hundred are grouped together with those aged one 
hundred. 324  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
has a long tradition, dating back to the work of Albert Ando and Franco 
Modigliani.'3  Their lessons  bear repeating.  First, increases  in any co- 
hort's  propensity  to  consume  will,  all  else  equal,  raise  the  rate  of 
aggregate household spending and lower national saving. Second,  given 
the value  of  R,lY,,  higher  rates of  population  growth  and real wage 
growth mean higher rates of national saving for the following  reason. 
In the life  cycle  model,  the propensity to consume  is predicted to rise 
with  age.  Since  growth  in both population  and real wages  raises  the 
values of P,lIP,  and ri,tr, for younger cohorts and lowers them for older 
cohorts,  such growth produces a reweighting of a-i,  that reduces the rate 
of household  spending and raises the rate of national saving. 
The ultimate effect  of  growth in population  and real wages  on na- 
tional saving is ambiguous,  however,  because such growth is also likely 
to raise R,lY,. Faster population growth means that the remaining life- 
time resources  and incomes  of  the young  play a bigger role in deter- 
mining the overall value of R,lY,. But since the ratio of future resources 
to current income is larger for the young than it is for the old, population 
growth raises R,lY,.  Faster real wage  growth also raises R,lY, because 
it raises the resources-to-income  ratio of the young,  while  leaving that 
of the old unchanged. 
The  final  lesson  is  that redistribution across  generations  can  alter 
national  saving.  It does  so by altering the age-resource profile,  or the 
resources-to-output  ratio, or both. Government tax and transfer policy 
can,  of course,  produce such redistribution.  Consider government re- 
distribution among living  generations-specifically,  from the young to 
the old at time t-that  leaves  the resources-to-output ratio unchanged. 
Such redistribution is accomplished  by raising the present value of taxes 
net of the transfers of young generations (the generational account) and 
reducing the present value of taxes net of the transfers of older gener- 
ations,  while  leaving  unchanged  the net tax burden faced  by current 
generations  collectively.  This policy  lowers  the values  of ri,tr, for the 
young and raises them for the old. Thus it raises the weights  applied to 
relatively  high values of a-i,  and reduces those applied to relatively  low 
values,  producing a higher rate of aggregate household  spending. 
Next,  consider redistribution from future to current generations that 
raises the resources-to-output  ratio, but leaves the age-resource profile 
13.  Ando and Modigliani  (1963). Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence  J. Kotlikoff,  and John Sabelhaus  325 
unchanged.  This  can  be  accomplished  by  reducing  the  generational 
account of each current generation by just the amount needed to produce 
the same percentage  increase in its remaining lifetime  resources.  This 
policy raises the rate of household  spending by an amount that depends 
on the resource-  and population-weighted  economywide  propensity to 
consume  (the bracketed term in equation 3). 
Data Construction and Sources 
To  decompose  changes  in national  saving  across  the four periods 
chosen,  one needs to know the value of the five factors listed above for 
each period.  Of these factors,  the rate of government spending and the 
age-composition  of the population are readily available.  This is not the 
case  for the value  of  c,i or ri,, both of  which  are needed  to form (x;,. 
The value of ri, is also needed to form the age-resource profile and the 
resources-to-output  ratio. 
Our procedures  for calculating  c,,  and ri, are described  in detail  in 
appendix A. Briefly,  we form these variables, or their constituent com- 
ponents,  by using  cross-sectional  profiles  and population  data to dis- 
tribute aggregate variables by age and sex.  For example,  to determine 
the  average  value  of  consumption  of  fifty-three-year-old  males  and 
females in the period 1960-61,  we use CEX and other data to determine 
relative per capita consumption  by age and sex during that period,  and 
use this age-sex  relative  consumption  profile and data on the age-sex 
composition  of the population during this period to distribute aggregate 
personal consumption  expenditures  from the NIPA  for this period by 
age  and  sex.  As  a  second  example,  consider  how  we  calculate  the 
human wealth  component  of  the resources  of thirty-eight-year-old  fe- 
males in  1972.  For 1972 and subsequent years we distribute actual or 
projected NIPA labor income by age and sex,  using profiles of relative 
average annual earnings by age and sex derived from the U.S.  Census 
Bureau's  annual Current Population  Survey  (CPS),  as well  as actual 
and projected population  counts by age and sex.  The resulting  values 
for the  average  earnings  of  thiry-eight-year-old  females  in  1972,  of 
thirty-nine-year-old females in 1973, of forty-year-old females in 1974, 
and so forth are then actuarially discounted back to  1973. 
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holds,  as the life cycle  decisionmakers.  In practice,  it is impossible  to 
conduct  this type  of  cohort  analysis  on the basis  of  the household  as 
the decisionmaking  unit for the simple reason that households  are tran- 
sient entities  that appear and disappear through time,  as the result of 
marriage, divorce,  separation,  and death. The empirical  issue  arising 
from treating individual adults within a multiadult household as separate 
decisionmakers  is how to allocate  household  income and consumption 
among them.  We allocate  the total income  earned by married couples 
evenly  between  the husband and wife,  and allocate  income  earned by 
other  adults  to  those  adults.  In  allocating  married couples'  income 
evenly  among spouses,  we are, in effect,  implicitly  viewing  marriage 
as the choice  of  an occupation  that generates  income  (which  may be 
negative)  for each spouse.  To examine  the sensitivity  of our results to 
this  view  of  marriage,  we  also  present results  in  which  the  income 
earned by spouses  is allocated  to the nominal recipient of that income. 
As described in more detail in appendix A,  household  consumption 
taken from the CEX is allocated among adults in the following  manner. 
Wherever it is possible  to determine the particular consumer of a good 
or service  within the household,  such as the consumer of pipe tobacco, 
this individual  is allocated  this consumption.  Consumption that is not 
so easily  allocable-such  as expenditure on food-is  allocated among 
all  adults and children,  using  a child-adult equivalency  scale  and as- 
suming  equal consumption  by all adults.  The children's  consumption 
is then reallocated  equally  to each coresident parent. 
Illustrating  the Data  Construction 
Our general method of distributing an aggregate variable in time t, 
say Zt, by age and sex can be understood more precisely by considering 
the following  equation: 
100 
(4)  z  =  zit?  E  (Vill  Pil  +  v!,  P?) 
i=  ,x 
In equation 4,  z4,  stands for the average value of Z for forty-year-old 
males  at time t; v;"  and v!, stand for the ratios of the average values  of 
Z for males  and females,  respectively,  aged i at time t to z..,;  and Plt7 
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aged i in year t. Given the value of Z, from the NIPA or another source, 
the relative  age-sex  profile  of Z (v;. and vf.,)  calculated  from a cross- 
sectional  survey,  and P", and P? calculated  from population data, one 
can use equation 4 to solve  for z4,.  One can then multiply this value 
by v7i (v?t') to determine z,7 (z-?,), that is, the average value of Z for males 
(females)  aged i in year t. Finally,  one can form a population-weighted 
average of z7, and z-f,  to produce an average value of Z for age group i 
at time t. 
In the  case  of  ci,,  we  use  the  1961-62,  1972-73,  1984-86,  and 
1987-90  CEX  and the  1977  and  1987 National  Medical  Expenditure 
Surveys  (NMES)  to form relative profiles of total consumption by age 
and sex.  By total consumption we mean all of the components of house- 
hold consumption  that are included  in the NIPA  aggregate,  including 
health care and imputed rent on owner-occupied  housing.  The age-sex 
relative consumption  profiles for the four periods derived in these cal- 
culations are used with period-specific  counts of population by age and 
sex  to distribute NIPA  values  of aggregate household  consumption  in 
each of the four periods. 
Turning to ri,,  recall that this variable is the sums of annuitized and 
nonannuitized resources.  We form each of the components  of ri, sepa- 
rately and then add them together.  By annuitized resources we refer to 
the present value  of  future labor earnings  (human wealth),  social  se- 
curity  benefits,  private  and  government  employee  pension  benefits, 
government  health  care benefits,  welfare  benefits,  and other govern- 
ment transfers; and, as negative  annuities,  the present value of future 
taxes.  Taxes  include  labor  and capital  income  taxes,  indirect  taxes, 
payroll taxes,  and property and other taxes.  Nonannuitized  resources 
refer simply  to holdings  of net wealth. 
The  computation  of  cohorts'  nonannuitized  resources  for the four 
periods  involves  distributing  by  age  and sex  the  aggregate  value  of 
household  net wealth for each year, and then averaging over the years 
defining the four periods.  The computation of each component  of  an- 
nuitized resources is more involved.  First, for each year between  1960 
and 1993  the national  aggregate  for a particular type  of  payment (or 
receipt) is distributed by age and sex,  according to the cross-sectional 
age-sex  relative profile that is applicable  to that payment (or receipt). 
For example,  aggregate  1965  social  security  benefits  are distributed 
according to the age-sex  relative profile for these benefits in 1965. This 328  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
yields  per capita estimates  of the payment (or receipt) by age and sex 
for that year.  The per capita annuity values  for years  after  1993  are 
estimated  by either distributing projected  aggregate  payments  (or re- 
ceipts)  according to the latest available cross-sectional  relative profile, 
or assuming  that age- and sex-specific  per capita values,  respectively, 
equal those  in  1993  or some  later year,  except  for an adjustment for 
productivity  growth. 
Second,  for each generation  in a given  year t, the present value of 
all future per capita payments of a particular type (for example,  indirect 
tax payments)  is computed by multiplying  these future per capita pay- 
ments by the generation's  projected population  in the relevant years, 
discounting  these  values  back to year t,  and dividing  the sum of  the 
discounted  values by the number of members of the generation alive in 
the base year. This method produces actuarially discounted  per capita 
present values of the particular payment (or receipt) for each generation 
alive in year t. We consider three pretax real discount rates: 3 percent, 
6 percent (our base case),  and 9 percent. 1' 
As  an example  of  this method for calculating  the different compo- 
nents of  annuitized resources,  consider  our estimate of human wealth 
(HW). The formula for human wealth in year t for individuals of sex x 
born in year k (HW-,;1)  is 
k+D 
(5)  HW-1.  =  e,, P,x, R-%'t  tk 
s=t 
where e,.  stands for the average earnings in year s of a member of the 
generation born in year k and of sex x; P,.  is the population in year s of 
the same sex-specific  generation; R  =  1/(1  +  r), where r is the rate of 
interest; and D  is  the maximum  age  of  life.  The calculation  of  e,.,  is 
given  by 
14.  These  rates bracket the pretax real rate of return observed,  on average,  between 
1961 and  1992,  where the rate of  return in year t is calculated  as [(NW,  -  E,  -  P,  + 
C, +  T,)/NW, -  1] -  1, such that NW, is household net worth in period t; E, is aggregate 
labor income,  excluding  contributions  to private pension  funds; P,  is pension  income, 
including  private  pensions,  government  employee  pensions,  workers'  compensation, 
and veterans'  benefits;  C, is personal consumption  expenditure; and T, is aggregate  net 
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(6) 
sk  d k Es 
(d-  Pill +  d'  P.)  sk  sk  SM  s 
s  =  t 
In equations  5 and 6,  ES is aggregate labor earnings in year s,  and dx,k 
is the ratio in year s of the average earnings of the generation born in 
year k and of  sex x to the average earnings of  our reference  group- 
those who were aged forty in year s (that  is, those for whom k =  s  -  40). 
The construction of relative profiles by age and sex (d-,.) is described 
by the following  equations: 
N ,sk 
wX  I  E  ski  j.ki 
(7)  js  N= 
and 
(8)  d.sk  k7, 
Kx,x-40 
In equation 7,  j.k  is the weighted  average (across cohort members in- 
dexed by i) of labor income; NxS,  is the number of observations  in year 
s of individuals of sex x born in year k;j->  i is the wage and salary income 
in year s of  the i-th individual  of  sex x who  was born in year k; and 
wX  is  the  person  weight  of  this  observation.  Equation  8  shows  the 
calculation  for year s of  the average labor income  of  members of the 
generation of sex x born in year k, relative to that of contemporaneous 
forty-year-old  males. 
The  national  aggregates  used  in these  calculations  come  from the 
National Income and Product Accounts,  the Federal Reserve  System's 
Flow of Funds (FOF), the American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI), 
the  Current Population  Survey,  and the  Survey  of  Current Business 
(SCB).  The  sources  for cross-sectional  relative  profiles  are the CPS, 
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the Consumer 
Expenditure  Survey,  the  Survey  of  Consumer  Finances  (SCF),  the 
Social  Security  Administration's  Annual  Statistical  Supplement 
(SSAASS),  and the  Health  Care Financing  Administration  (HCFA). 330  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Figure  1. Relative Total Consumption  Profiles 
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Source: Authors' calculations,  based on the CEX. 
The computations also use the historic and projected population counts 
of the Social  Security Administration (SSA). 
Looking  at the Data 
Before  decomposing  the changes  in the U.S.  saving rate during the 
postwar period,  it is  worth looking  at some  of  the data that we  have 
constructed.  Tables 3 and 4 present the average values of consumption, 
resources,  and  the  components  of  resources  for  males  and  females Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence  J. Kotlikoff,  and John Sabelhaus  331 
Figure  2. Relative Nonmedical  Consumption  Profiles 
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Source: Authors' calculations,  based on the CEX. 
within ten-year age groups in each of the four periods under consider- 
ation (1960-61,  1972-73,  1984-86,  and 1987-90). 
To start with consumption,  figure 1 presents cross-sectional  relative 
age-consumption  profiles  for  total  consumption  in  each  of  the  four 
periods.  Figure  2  does  the same  for nonmedical  consumption  alone. 
The periods are based on the availability of CEX data. For each period, 
the average consumption  of forty-year-olds  is normalized to one. 
The figures document a remarkable increase in the relative consump- 
tion of the elderly.  This increase is more pronounced if medical care is 
included in the measure of consumption,  but the increase in the relative oo 
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consumption  of nonmedical  goods  and services  is also striking. Figure 
3 depicts  the size  of housing,  medical,  and other consumption  for se- 
lected cohorts during the periods  1960-61  and 1987-90.  The first two 
panels  of  figure  3  show  these  components  in constant  1993  dollars. 
Consumption of all three was greater in the late 1980s than in the early 
1960s.  The third and fourth panels  show the shares of the three com- 
ponents.  They demonstrate that the share of medical consumption  was 
significantly  larger for all cohorts  in the later period.  For elderly  co- 
horts,  the  increase  in the  share of  medical  consumption  was  accom- 
panied by a decline  in the shares of both housing and other consumption 
between  the early  1960s and the late  1980s. 
Table 5 examines  some  of the numbers underlying figures  1 and 2. 
It reports the ratio of the average level  of total,  as well  as nonmedical, 
consumption  of sixty-,  seventy-,  and eighty-year-olds  to the respective 
levels  of twenty-,  thirty-,  and forty-year-olds  for each of the four pe- 
riods. Table 5 shows that in 1960-61  seventy-year-olds  consumed only 
71 percent of the amount consumed  by thirty-year-olds,  whereas over 
the period 1987-90  their consumption exceeded  that of thirty-year-olds 
by  18 percent.  In the case  of nonmedical  consumption,  seventy-year- 
olds consumed only 63 percent of the amount consumed by thirty-year- 
olds  in  1960-61,  compared with 91 percent over the period  1987-90. 
The increase in consumption of the elderly relative to other age groups 
has been equally  dramatic. 
Another way to summarize the increase in the relative consumption 
of the elderly is in terms of their share of total household consumption. 
In the early 1960s the elderly (those aged sixty-five and over) accounted 
for  10.6  percent of  U.S.  household  consumption  and 14.1  percent of 
the U.S.  population.  By the late 1980s, they accounted for 17.8 percent 
of total household consumption and 16.4 percent of the total population. 
Based  on  demographics  alone,  the  elderly's  share  of  consumption 
should have risen by  16.3 percent; instead,  it rose by 67.9  percent. 
This striking increase in the relative consumption of the elderly has 
coincided  with  an  equally  remarkable  increase  in  their  relative  re- 
sources.  Figure 4 depicts  changes  in the age distribution of resources 
(r I/rt) across the four periods. '1 Table 6 presents ratios of the average 
15.  The  kinks  at  age  eighty  in  figure  4  reflect  our  method  of  imputing  relative 
nonhuman wealth  for individuals  of this age and above.  The small number of observa- Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence  J. Kotlikoff,  and John Sabelhaus  337 
Figure 3. Composition  of Total  Consumption,  by Age 
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Table 5.  Consumption  of the Elderly  Relative to the Young 
Ratio 
Age comparison and 
type of consumption  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Total 
Age 60/age 20  1.17  1.37  1.58  1.59 
Age 70/age  20  0.97  1.21  1.56  1.64 
Age 80/age 20  0.89  1.16  1.61  1.60 
Age 60/age  30  0.86  0.93  1.09  1.15 
Age 70/age 30  0.71  0.82  1.07  1.18 
Age 80/age 30  0.65  0.79  1.11  1.16 
Age 60/age 40  0.77  0.83  0.87  0.91 
Age 70/age 40  0.64  0.73  0.86  0.94 
Age 80/age 40  0.58  0.70  0.89  0.92 
Nonmedical 
Age 60/age 20  1.11  1.28  1.43  1.42 
Age 70/age 20  0.86  1.04  1.22  1.28 
Age  80/age 20  0.75  0.91  1.16  1.11 
Age 60/age 30  0.81  0.86  0.97  1.02 
Age 70/age 30  0.63  0.70  0.83  0.91 
Age  80/age 30  0.55  0.61  0.78  0.80 
Age 60/age 40  0.73  0.78  0.77  0.80 
Age 70/age 40  0.57  0.63  0.66  0.72 
Age  80/age 40  0.49  0.55  0.62  0.63 
Source: Authors' calculations,  based on the CEX anld  the NMES. See text and appendix A for details. 
resources of sixty-,  seventy-,  and eighty-year-olds  to those of twenty-, 
thirty-, and forty-year-olds. In 1960-61  the average resources of seventy- 
year-olds  were only 55 percent as large as those of thirty-year-olds.  In 
1987-90  they  were  81  percent as large.  The resources  of  other older 
cohorts  have  also  grown  significantly,  relative  to  those  of  younger 
cohorts,  over the past three decades. 
Figures 5 through 8 show the components of ri,/r,: the human wealth 
ratio (hw/,lr,),  nonhuman wealth ratio (nhw/,lr,),  pension  wealth ratio 
(pwj,/r,), and generational account ratio (gaj,/r,).'6 Figure 5 indicates a 
tions  at these  ages  in  the  Survey  of  Consumer  Finances  precludes  forming  separate 
estimates  of average nonhuman wealth at these ages.  Here, we assume that the relative 
nonhuman wealth  of  those  aged eighty  or above  equals  that of eighty-year-olds  of  the 
same sex. 
16.  Note that our base case calculations  assume a 1.2 percent annual growth of labor 
productivity  after  1993,  and a discount  rate of 6 percent. Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence  J. Kotlikoff,  and John Sabelhaus  339 
Figure  4. Ratio of Cohort Resources  Per Capita  to Total Resources  Per Capita 
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Source: Authors' calculations,  using the data sources for table 5. 
sizable decline  in the human wealth ratio for young cohorts across the 
four periods.  Indeed,  this  decline  accounts  for  most  of  the  overall 
decline in ri,tr, for young cohorts.  The reduction in the ratio of human 
wealth to resources at these ages is the result of a low projected rate of 
labor income  growth  compared to that of  the  1960s  and early  1970s. 
Figure 6 shows  profiles  of  the ratio of  nonhuman wealth to resources 
for the four periods.  Although  this ratio falls  for all cohorts over age 
thirty-three, it falls  relatively  more for the oldest age groups. Figure 7 
presents the ratio of  pension  wealth  to resources  for each of  the four 
periods. As indicated,  cohorts at preretirement ages experienced  espe- 340  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Table 6. Resources  of the Elderly  Relative to the Younga 
Ratio 
Age comparison  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Age 60/age 20  0.79  0.97  1.10  1.13 
Age 70/age 20  0.58  0.78  0.92  0.95 
Age 80/age 20  0.43  0.49  0.48  0.50 
Age 60/age 30  0.74  0.85  0.95  0.97 
Age 70/age 30  0.55  0.67  0.79  0.81 
Age 80/age 30  0.40  0.42  0.41  0.43 
Age 60/age 40  0.73  0.82  0.90  0.93 
Age 70/age 40  0.54  0.66  0.74  0.78 
Age 80/age 40  0.40  0.41  0.39  0.41 
Source: Authors' calculations,  based on the CPS (March iiles),  the SCF,  the NIPA,  unpublished budget projections 
provided by the OMB, and unpublished population projections provided by the SSA.  See text and appendix A for details. 
a. Rate of discount is 6 percent. 
cially  rapid growth in pension  wealth over the last three decades.  The 
increase in pw/,lr, accounts  for a sizable part of the overall increase in 
rit/rt for these cohorts. 
Figure  8  shows  changes  over  time  in the ratio of  the generational 
account to resources.  Note that all cohorts experienced declines  in gait/ 
rt between  the early  1960s  and late  1980s.  However,  the decline  was 
much  greater for  cohorts  aged  fifty-five  and older.  In  1960-61,  for 
example,  the  present  value  of  net  transfers  to  seventy-year-olds 
amounted  to  3 percent of  per capita resources.  In the late  1980s  the 
corresponding figure was about 22 percent. Changes in the generational 
account  are clearly  responsible  for most of  the rise in the relative  re- 
sources of the elderly  during the postwar period. 
Figure  9  graphs age-specific  consumption  propensities  (acit) in the 
four periods.  In each period the propensity to consume is roughly con- 
stant for ages up to about sixty,  and then rises steadily.  There is a local 
peak  between  ages  thirty-five  and forty-five  that appears  to  reflect 
household  expenditures  on child rearing. Note that this peak occurs at 
later ages  through time,  which  is consistent  with the trend of  parents 
having their first child at later ages. 
The most striking feature of figure 9, however,  is the very substantial 
increase in the consumption propensities of older Americans over time. 
For example,  eighty-year-olds'  propensity  to consume  rose  from 8.7 
percent in  1960-61  to  13.6  in the period  1987-90.  However,  there is Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence  J. Kotlikoff,  and John Sabelhaus  341 
Figure  5.  Ratio  of Cohort  Human  Wealth Per Capita  to Total Resources  Per Capita 
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Source: Authors' calculations,  based on the CPS and the NIPA. 
no corresponding increase in the consumption propensities of the young 
or the middle-aged. 1'7 
Returning briefly to the point made above that, unlike propensities 
to consume out of total remaining lifetime resources that do not change 
17.  The findings  that the consumption  propensities  of  the very old  have  risen and 
that those of the young and middle-aged  have remained relatively  constant are robust to 
different  assumed  values  of  the  discount  rate.  At  a  discount  rate of  3  percent,  for 
example,  eighty-year-olds'  propensity to consume  rises from 8.6  percent in 1960-61  to 
12.4  percent  in  1987-90.  At  a discount  rate of  9  percent,  it rises  from  8.9  to  14.9 
percent.  Detailed  consumption  propensities  by age  under alternative discount  rate as- 
sumptions are available  from the authors upon request. 342  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
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Source: Authors' calculations,  based on the SCF and the NIPA. 
when government  receipts  and payments are reclassified,  propensities 
to consume  or save out of disposable  income  are creatures of vocabu- 
lary,  figure  10 presents propensities  to save out of disposable  income 
by  age,  in the late  1980s,  for two  different  definitions  of  disposable 
income.  Conventional  disposable  income  is the sum of  labor income, 
capital income,  and pension  income less  net taxes. Alternative dispos- 
able income  is almost  identical,  except  that all social  security contri- 
butions are classified  as loans to the government,  and all social security 
benefits are classified  as the repayment of principal plus interest on past Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence  J. Kotlikoff,  and John Sabelhaus  343 
Figure  7. Ratio of Cohort  Pension  Wealth Per Capita  to Total Resources  Per Capita 
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Source: Authors' calculations,  based on the data sources for figure 5. 
social security loans,  less  an old age tax. "8  The figure is remarkable in 
two respects.  First, based on the conventional  definition,  average pro- 
18.  The old age social  security tax is negative (positive)  if the social security benefits 
received  by a cohort exceed  (are less  than) the return of  principal plus  interest on the 
cohort's  past social  security  contributions.  The calculation  assumes  that the timing  of 
the payment  of  this  old  age  tax  coincides  with  the time  at which  the cohort  actually 
receives  social  security  benefits.  For example,  if the present value  (to age zero) of the 
old age social  security  net tax of a generation is 30 percent as large as the present value 
(to  age  zero)  of  its  lifetime  social  security  benefits,  we  assume  that  each  year  the 
generation faces  a tax equal to 30 percent of  its social  security benefits,  and otherwise 
treat payments to and benefits  received  from social  security  as equivalent  to  investing 
in a financial asset. 344  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Figure  8. Ratio of Cohort  Generational  Account  Per Capita  to Total Resources  Per 
Capita 
Ratio 
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Source: Authors' calculations,  based onl the CPS, the NIPA, the SCF, and unpublished budget projections from the 0MB. 
pensities  to save are substantially negative for the young and the old. '" 
Second,  propensities  to save are very different for the two definitions 
of disposable  income.  Under the conventional  definition,  for example, 
both  forty-  and  sixty-five-year-olds  have  zero  propensity  to  save, 
19.  The  fact  that other  studies  (for example,  Bosworth,  Burtless,  and Sabelhaus, 
1991) report positive  propensities  to save out of disposable  income at all ages,  notwith- 
standing  their  use  of  conventional  classifications,  appears  to  reflect  their  failure  to 
include all the components  of consumption,  in particular, medical goods  and services. Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence  J. Kotlikoff,  and John Sabelhaus  345 
Figure  9.  Average Propensity  to Consume  out of Total Resources, 
Fraction of resources 
1960-61 
1972-73 





23  28  33  38  43  48  53  58  63  68  73  78  83 
Age 
Source: Authors' calculations,  using the data sources for table 5. 
a. The rate of discount is 6 percent. 
whereas  under the alternative definition their propensities  to save  are 
13 percent and  -75  percent,  respectively. 
Figure 11 continues the main thread of the paper by showing changes 
in the age composition  of the U.S.  population over the four periods.  It 
indicates  a small rise in the share of the population over age sixty-five 
since the early 1960s. It also indicates that compared with the early 1960s, 
in the late  1980s there were relatively more adults in their twenties and 
thirties, and relatively fewer adults in their forties and fifties. 
Figures  12 through 14 plot longitudinal profiles of labor and pension 
incomes and net tax flows.  Figure 15 plots total nonasset income,  com- 346  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Figure 10. Average  Propensity  to Save Out of Conventional  and Alternative 
Disposable  Income, 1987-90 
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Source: Authors' calculations,  using the data sources for tables 5 and 6. 
puted as labor plus pension income minus the net tax flow. The profiles 
are shown  for cohorts  at ten-year intervals,  beginning  with the cohort 
aged eighteen  in  1920.  The labor and pension  income  profiles exhibit 
the  expected  hump  shapes.  Labor incomes  peak  at  middle  age  and 
decline  sharply at retirement ages.  Pension incomes increase steeply  at 
retirement ages.20 The longitudinal  net tax profiles,  however,  show an 
20.  Pension  incomes  include  survivor,  disability,  and retirement benefits from pri- 
vate  and government  employee  pension  plans,  workers'  compensation,  and veterans' 
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Figure  11. Ratio of Cohort  Population  to Total Population 
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Source: Unpublished data provided by the SSA. 
interesting pattern. Generations that reach middle ages later in time pay 
substantially more in net taxes than those that reached these ages earlier. 
However,  cohorts that retire later in time receive  substantially greater 
net benefits from the government than do those that retired earlier. 
The total nonasset  income  profiles  are dominated by labor income 
during youth and middle age. After retirement, however,  they are dom- 
inated by higher pension  incomes  and negative  net taxes.  As a result, 
nonasset incomes  rise sharply at retirement and continue on an upward 
course thereafter. As was true for those who retired in the 1  940s,  1  950s, 
and 1960s,  future retirees will receive nonasset incomes that are higher 348  Brookings  Papers oni  Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Figure  12. Longitudinal  Profiles  of Labor  Income,  Selected  Cohorts" 
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Source: Authors' calculations,  based on the data sources for figure 5. 
a. Cohorts are determined by the year in which they were aged eighteen. 
than their peak nonasset incomes when they were working. This picture 
differs  dramatically  from  the textbook  illustration  of  life  cycle  age- 
nonasset income  profiles. 
Explaining the Postwar Decline in U.S. Saving 
Table  7 examines  the effect  on U.S.  saving  of  changes  in the five 
factors mentioned above: the age distribution of resources, propensities 
to consume,  the r-atio  of resources to output, the age distribution of the 
population,  and the rate of government spending. The factors involving Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence  J. Kotlikoff,  and John Sabelhaus  349 
Figure  13. Longitudinal  Profiles of Pension  Income,  Selected  Cohortsa 
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Source: Authors' calculations,  based on the data sources for figure 5. 
a. Cohorts are determined by the year in which they were aged eighteen. 
resources and consumption  propensities are calculated using a real dis- 
count rate of 6 percent. 
In each  panel  of  table  7,  the  numbers along  the diagonal  are the 
observed rates of U.S.  net national saving in the row period. The other 
numbers indicate the saving rate that would have been observed in the 
row  period,  had the  specified  saving  factor taken its  value  from the 
column period. 
The counterfactual analysis undertaken here is partial-equilibrium in 
nature. For example,  in asking  how  much higher U.S.  saving  would 
have been in the late 1980s,  had cohort-specific  consumption propens- 
ities been the same as those  of the early  1960s,  we are ignoring other 
factors that might have changed as a consequence  of a change in con- 
sumption propensities.  The following  exercises  are meant to convey the 
potential importance of various determinants of saving,  rather than to 
indicate  precisely  what the U.S.  saving  rate would  have  been  if  the 
world had evolved  differently. 350  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Figure 14. Longitudinal  Profiles of the Generational  Account, Selected Cohorts, 
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Source: Authors' calculations,  based on the data sources for figure 8. 
a. Cohorts are determined by the year in which they were aged eighteen. 
Changes  in the Age-Resource  Distribution 
The first panel of table 7 shows the effect on the U.S.  saving rate of 
changes over time in the age distribution of resources. The first number 
in the last row (4.97)  is the saving rate that, ceteris paribus, would have 
been observed  in  1987-90,  had the age-resource distribution of  1960- 
61 prevailed  during this period.  Since  the actual saving rate observed 
in 1987-90  is 3.38  percent, the saving rate would have been 47 percent 
higher had the age-resource  distribution of the late  1980s been that of 
the early  1960s.  Comparison of the last number in the first row of the 
first panel  of  table  7  (5.53)  with  the  actual  saving  rate in  1960-61 
(7.85),  provides another way to assess  the importance of the change in 
the age-resource  distribution.  It shows that the saving rate would have 
been 30 percent lower  if the age-resource  distribution had changed as Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence  J. Kotlikoff,  and John Sabelhaus  351 
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Source: Authors' calculations,  based on the data sources for table 6. 
a. Nonasset income is labor income plus pension income less net tax flow. Cohorts are determined by the year in which 
they were aged eighteen. 
it did over  the three decades,  but everything  else  had remained as it 
was in  1960-61.  The finding that the shift in the age-resource  distri- 
bution contributed to a decline  in the national saving rate is robust to 
alternative discount rate assumptions.2 
The changes  in the age-resource  profile observed  between  the late 
1980s and the early  1960s did not occur overnight.  Figure 4 points this 
out,  and table 7  shows  that the shifting  age-resource  distribution has 
been responsible  for a steady decline  in the U.S.  national saving rate. 
21.  This result is sustained  under  the alternative  discount  rate  assumptions  of 3 and 
9 percent. The results from all the counterfactual  experiments  under  these alternative 
discount  rates  are available  from the authors  upon request. 352  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1996 
Table 7. The Effect on the Net National  Saving Rate of Counterfactual  Factor Valuesa 
Percent 
Factor and period of 
Period of counterfactual factor  value 
counterfactual saving rate  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Age-resource distribution (rilr) 
1960-61  7.85  6.21  5.54  5.53 
1972-73  11.10  9.87  9.42  9.37 
1984-86  5.87  4.72  4.51  4.38 
1987-90  4.97  3.74  3.51  3.38 
Consumption propensity (a;) 
1960-61  7.85  5.01  8.45  6.85 
1972-73  12.49  9.87  12.86  11.22 
1984-86  4.04  0.98  4.51  2.80 
1987-90  4.85  1.73  5.06  3.38 
Age distribution (PiIP) 
1960-61  7.85  9.60  9.01  8.57 
1972-73  7.97  9.87  9.23  8.69 
1984-86  2.93  4.89  4.51  3.85 
1987-90  2.44  4.24  4.01  3.38 
Resources-to-output ratio (RIY) 
1960-61  7.85  11.84  4.33  5.42 
1972-73  5.75  9.87  2.11  3.24 
1984-86  8.03  12.01  4.51  5.60 
1987-90  5.90  10.01  2.26  3.38 
Government spending rate (GIY) 
1960-61  7.85  8.16  8.03  8.27 
1972-73  9.57  9.87  9.74  9.98 
1984-86  4.33  4.64  4.51  4.75 
1987-90  2.96  3.27  3.14  3.38 
Addendum  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Actual ratios' 
RIY  12.53  11.82  13.15  12.96 
HWIY  11.45  10.38  11.59  11.31 
NHWIY  3.69  3.20  3.21  3.18 
PWIY  0.95  1.10  1.37  1.36 
GAIY  3.56  2.86  3.02  2.88 
GIY  21.59  21.28  21.41  21.17 
Source: Authors' calculations,  using the data sources for tables 5 and 6. 
a. In each panel except the last, the numbers along the diagonal are the observed rates of net national saving in the row 
period. The other numbers indicate the saving rate that would have been observed in the row period if the specifed saving 
factor had taken its value from the column period. 
b. RIY =  (HW +  NHW +  PW - GA)/Y,  where R is total resources. HW is human wealth. NHW is nonhuman  wealth, PW 
is pension wealth, GA is the generational account, and Y is the net national product. G denotes government purchases of 
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Table 8. The Effect on the Net National  Saving Rate of Counterfactual  Propensities 
to Consume  of the Old and the Younga 
Percent 
Period of counterfactualfactor  value  Cohort and per- 
iodh  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Old 
1960-61  7.85  7.30  6.61  6.28 
1972-73  10.52  9.87  9.06  8.70 
1984-86  6.22  5.45  4.51  4.03 
1987-90  5.74  4.91  3.88  3.38 
Young 
1960-61  7.85  5.57  9.69  8.42 
1972-73  11.84  9.87  13.67  12.40 
1984-86  2.33  0.03  4.51  3.28 
1987-90  2.50  0.21  4.57  3.38 
Source: Authors' calculations,  using the data sources for tables 5 and 6. 
a. See table 7,  note a for organization of this table. 
b. Old cohorts are defined as those aged sixty-live or older and young cohorts as those younger than age sixty-live. 
Changes  in Average Propensities  to Consume 
The  second  panel  of  table  7  shows  the effect  on  the net national 
saving rate of changes over time in the average propensities to consume 
of both young (aged under sixty-five)  and old (aged sixty-five  and over) 
cohorts. The last number in the first column (4.85)  indicates that, other 
things equal,  the net national saving rate in 1987-90  would have been 
43 percent higher had consumption propensities equaled those of  1960- 
61.  This increase  in the saving rate is not surprising, given  the much 
larger consumption  propensities of elderly cohorts in 1987-90  that are 
displayed  in figure 9.  However,  the result that changing  consumption 
propensities  contributed to the decline in the national saving rate is not 
robust to the choice  of the discount rate: at 3 percent,  substituting the 
consumption  propensities  of  1960-61  for those of  1987-90  produces a 
lower saving  rate (2.55). 
Table  8 decomposes  these  changes  in  saving  into  those  due  to 
changes over time in the consumption propensities of the young and of 
the old.  The first panel of  table 8 shows  the effect  on saving  rates of 
changing the consumption  propensities  of older generations.  Had only 
the  consumption  propensities  of  older  generations  remained  at their 
level  in  1960-61,  the  saving  rate would  have  been  5.74  percent  in 
1987-90,  instead of 3.38  percent. The conclusion that sharp increases in 354  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
older generations' propensities to consume are partly responsible for the 
decline in national saving is sustained under alternative rates of discount. 
The second  panel of  table 8 shows  that replacing the consumption 
propensities  of  younger  generations  in  1987-90  with  their values  in 
1960-61  would actually slightly lower the saving rate-from  3.38  per- 
cent to 2.50  percent.  The somewhat  higher consumption  propensities 
of those in their twenties and early thirties in the early 1960s, compared 
with  the  late  1980s,  is  responsible  for  this  result.  This  finding  is 
strengthened if one discounts at 3 percent, but reversed if one discounts 
at 9 percent. 
Changes  in the Age Distribution  of the Population 
The third panel of table 7 shows  the effect  on U.S.  saving  rates of 
changes  over time in the age composition  of  the population.  As  indi- 
cated,  had the age distribution of the population in 1960-61  prevailed 
in 1987-90,  the U.S.  saving rate would have been 2.44  percent, rather 
than 3.38  percent.  This result can be understood by recalling  that the 
propensity to consume  rises with age and, as shown in figure 11, that 
the age distribution of the early 1960s featured relatively more middle- 
aged individuals  and relatively  fewer younger individuals  than did the 
age distribution of the late  1980s. 
These results are independent of the choice  of discount rate. To see 
why,  note that the product cij,  in equation 3 equals the per capita 
consumption  of cohort i in year t, which is the same regardless of how 
one decomposes  this quantity between u,  and ri,. Further, R,lr, equals 
Pt,  which is also independent of the discount rate. Hence the effect  of 
changes  in the ratio PjtIPt on the national saving rate will be the same 
for all discount rates. 
Changes  in the Ratio of Resources  to Output 
Values of R,lY, and its components  for the four periods are reported 
in the bottom of panel of table 7. This ratio rises over time, from 12.53 
in the early  1960s to  12.96  in the late  1980s.  As the table shows,  the 
principal  reason  for  the  rise  is  the  decline  in  the ratio of  aggregate 
generational  accounts to income  (GAtlYt). In other words,  the govern- 
ment's  redistribution of resources from future to living  generations  is 
the main reason for the increase in the resources-to-income  ratio. Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence  J. Kotlikoff,  and John Sabelhaus  355 
Recall  that,  ceteris  paribus,  a higher  ratio of  resources  to  output 
means a higher rate of consumption  out of  net national income  and a 
lower  net national saving  rate. The fourth panel of  table 7 shows  the 
effect of changes over time in the resources-to-output ratio (R,lY,). The 
number in the last row of the first column number (5.90)  indicates that 
saving  rates would  have  been  75  percent higher if the  1960-61  ratio 
had prevailed in 1987-90.  The number in the first row of the last column 
(5.42)  shows  that if the  1987-90  ratio had prevailed  in  1960-61,  the 
saving rate would have been one-third smaller. The magnitude (but not 
the sign)  of  the effect  on  saving  of  the increase  in the resources-to- 
output ratio is sensitive  to the choice  of discount rate.22 
Changes  in the Government Spending Rate 
The fifth panel of table 7 considers  how changes in the government 
spending rate (G,lY,) have affected  national saving.  As reported in the 
bottom panel  of  table  7,  this  rate fell  slightly,  from 21.6  percent  in 
1960-61  to 21.2  percent in 1987-90.  Had G,/Y, taken its 1960-61  value 
in 1987-90,  the U.S.  saving rate would have been  12 percent smaller; 
that is,  the change  in the rate of government  spending during the last 
three decades was not responsible for the low rate of national saving in 
the late  1980s. 
The Annuitization of the Elderly's Resources and Their 
Increased Propensity to Consume 
One likely  explanation  for the postwar increase in the propensity of 
the elderly to consume  is the remarkable increase in the extent to which 
the elderly's  resources are annuitized.  Moreover,  a significant share of 
these annuities are medicare and medicaid benefits that are provided in 
kind, in the form of the consumption  of medical goods  and services. 
The data in tables  9-12  are similar to those reported by Auerbach 
and others.23 Tables 9 and 10 decompose  total resources into bequeath- 
22.  Assuming  a discount  rate of 3 percent yields  a saving rate of 7.49  percent when 
the 1960-61  value of RIY is substituted for the 1987-90  value; using a 9 percent discount 
rate produces a saving  rate of 4.46  percent. 
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able resources  and their components,  nonhuman wealth  and the term 
value of life  insurance,  and annuitized resources,  which equal the dif- 
ference between total resources and bequeathable resources.  Tables  11 
and  12 report these  components  as a fraction of  total resources.  The 
extent of resource annuitization (R') is computed as the ratio of annui- 
tized to total resources,  that is 
(9)  R'  =  1  -  TERM +  NHW 
9  Ra =I 
HW +  NHW +  PW  GA' 
where TERM stands for the average term value of life  insurance, HW 
stands for average human wealth,  NHW stands for average nonhuman 
wealth,  PW stands for average private pension  wealth,  and GA stands 
for the generational  account. 
Table  11 shows  that for males aged sixty-five  and over, R' was two- 
and-a-half  times  larger in  1990  than it was  in  1960,  reflecting  an in- 
crease  from 0. 16 to 0.41.  For elderly  females,  the increase  was even 
bigger-from  0.18  in 1960 to 0.50  in 1990 (table 12). This larger share 
of elderly persons'  annuitized resources implies  an equal and opposite 
decline  in their share of bequeathable resources. 
Increased annuitization of resources means that the elderly have less 
reason to fear that they will run out of resources if they live longer than 
expected.  Consequently,  they  are likely  to  choose  to  consume  at  a 
higher rate. As demonstrated by Kotlikoff  and Avia Spivak,  the avail- 
ability  of  annuities  can  make  a great difference  to  the  consumption 
levels  of the elderly,  even  when the elderly are not very risk averse.24 
For example,  according  to  their simulations,  moderately  risk-averse 
elderly  persons  with  no  bequest  motive,  nor any explicit  or implicit 
means of acquiring annuity insurance will,  on average, fail to consume 
a third of their resources before they die. 
Assuming  that individuals  do not have access  to annuity insurance, 
either explicit  or implicit,  at the margin, they will likely plan to spend 
down their net wealth to zero and then consume their annuity income. 
At  this  point,  their  average  propensity  to  consume  is  mechanically 
determined  and is  guaranteed to rise  with  age.  This  is  because  con- 
sumption  equals  annuity income,  and resources  equal the present ex- 
pected value of annuity income.  So the average propensity to consume 
24.  Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981). ON 
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(APC) is equal to one divided by the actuarial value of $ 1.00.  Assuming 
that survival probabilities decline with age, this ratio will rise with age. 
For example,  if the discount rate is zero, the APC will simply equal the 
individual's  life  expectancy.  This  line  of  argument suggests  that the 
government's  annuitization of the resources of the elderly has, in effect, 
forced the elderly  to consume  a larger share of their resources in each 
successive  year. 
Questioning the Findings 
This section  addresses various questions  about the reliability  of our 
findings. 
Allocating  Couples'  Incomes  to Nominal Recipients 
The results presented above  are based on income,  tax,  and transfer 
profiles  that were  constructed  from  microeconomic  data sets.  In the 
case  of married households,  we allocate  equal amounts of these flows 
to each spouse.  An alternative procedure would be to allocate  income 
to the person who nominally received it. Table 13 shows that the results 
produced  by  implementing  the  latter method  are almost  identical  to 
those  in the earlier tables.  For example,  the saving  rate for  1987-90 
with the resource distribution of  1960-61,  all else remaining the same, 
is 5.07  under the alternative method, instead of 4.97  (see the first panel 
of  table 7).  Using  the consumption  propensities  of  1960-61  yields  a 
saving rate of 4.93  in 1987-90  under the alternative method, compared 
to 4.85  under the former procedure (see  the second panel of table 7). 
Finally,  using  the ratio of resources  to output of  1960-61  produces a 
saving  rate of  5.81  in  1987-90  under the alternative method,  instead 
of 5.90  under the former procedure (see the fourth panel of table 7). 
If There Were No Annuity Markets 
The base  case  assumes  that individuals  can convert future income 
flows  into current consumption  at actuarially fair rates of  discount- 
that is,  using  the pretax rate of  interest  and the probability  of  death 
conditional  on  age.  This  is  equivalent  to  assuming  the  existence  of 
actuarially fair annuity insurance,  whether explicit  or implicit.  To in- 364  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Table 13. The Effect on the Net National  Saving Rate of Counterfactual  Factor 
Values-Allocating  Income  to Nominal  Recipientsa 
Percent 
Factor and period of 
Period of counterfactualfactor  value 
counterfactual saving rate  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Age-resource distribution (rilr) 
1960-61  7.85  6.19  5.52  5.55 
1972-73  11.16  9.87  9.39  9.36 
1984-86  6.00  4.75  4.51  4.40 
1987-90  5.07  3.75  3.49  3.38 
Consumption prospensity (ar,) 
1960-61  7.85  4.88  8.39  6.78 
1972-73  12.59  9.87  12.94  11.32 
1984-86  4.10  0.92  4.51  2.81 
1987-90  4.93  1.68  5.05  3.38 
Resources-to-output ratio (RIY) 
1960-61  7.85  11.98  4.46  5.51 
1972-73  5.59  9.87  2.07  3.16 
1984-86  7.91  12.05  4.51  5.57 
1987-90  5.81  10.08  2.29  3.38 
Addendum  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Actual ratios" 
RIY  12.68  11.94  13.29  13.10 
HWIY  11.56  10.45  11.66  11.39 
NHWIY  3.69  3.20  3.21  3.18 
PW/Y  0.96  1.11  1.37  1.36 
GAIY  3.53  2.82  2.95  2.82 
Source: Authors' calculations,  using the data sources for tables 5 and 6. 
a. See table 7.  note a, for organization of this table. 
b. See table 7, note b, for definitions of variables shown. 
vestigate  the  robustness  of  our  results  to  this  assumption,  we  now 
consider  the opposite  assumption-that  no annuity insurance is avail- 
able  at the margin.  In this  case,  the appropriate rate for discounting 
future flows  is simply  the pretax rate of interest. 
Table 14 shows average resources for ten-year age groups in the four 
periods under the assumption of no annuity markets. Compared to the 
results of tables 3 and 4, total resources are higher under the no annuity 
markets assumption,  as would be expected  from the lower rate of dis- 
count.  Also,  because  of  the greater annuitization  of  the resources  of 
older cohorts in the late  1980s,  compared to the early  1960s,  for older N  C  m  oo  C 
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cohorts the difference  between resources under the two cases is greater 
in the late  1980s,  compared to the early  1960s. 
Table  15 indicates  that the assumption of no annuity insurance does 
affect the magnitude,  but not the sign,  of the saving factors considered 
in table 7.25 Under this assumption,  applying the propensities  to con- 
sume of  1960-61  to the cohort-specific  resource levels of the late 1980s 
increases the saving rate from 3.38  percent to 6.23  percent, rather than 
to 4.85  percent under the base case  (see  the second  panel in table 7). 
Substituting the age-resource distribution and resources-to-income  ratio 
of  1960-61  in place of their respective  1987-90  values also leads to an 
increase in national saving.  In the case of the age-resource distribution, 
the saving rate increases  from 3.38  percent to 5.23  percent, instead of 
to 4.97  percent under the base case. Finally, using the ratio of resources 
to output of  1960-61  in place of that of  1987-90  increases the saving 
rate from 3.38  percent to 4.60  percent, instead of to 5.90  percent under 
the base case.  Substituting  the population shares of  1960-61  in place 
of those of  1987-90  results in the same saving rate as in the base case 
(2.44  percent).  The  reason,  as  mentioned  earlier,  is  that the rate of 
discount  does  not  affect  the  calculated  effect  on  national  saving  of 
changes  in the age composition  of the population.26 
Future Growth in Medicare  and Medicaid 
The future course  of fiscal policy  is uncertain. However,  by incor- 
porating  federal  revenue  and outlay  projections  that differ  from  the 
baseline  used  in our analysis,  we can consider the implications  of  al- 
ternative future policies.  For example,  the resolution considered by the 
Congress  in December  1995 to balance the federal budget by the year 
2002  proposed  cuts  in  the  growth  of  medicare  and medicaid  and in 
projected government  purchases.  It also included reductions in taxes, 
mainly in the form of additional deductions against taxable income.  As 
table  16  shows,  projecting  future transfer payments  on  the  basis  of 
these budget proposals does  not materially alter the level  or the distri- 
bution of resources  across cohorts. 
Table 17 shows that under this case,  the results of our counterfactual 
25.  All the results in table  15 use the base case discount rate of 6 percent. 
26.  In equation 2,  ot1,r1,  is simply equal to ci,, which is independent of the definition 
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Table 15: The Effect on the Net National  Saving Rate of Counterfactual  Factor 
Values-No  Annuity  Insurancea 
Percent 
Factor and period of 
Period of countetfactualfactor  value 
couniterfactual  saving rate  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Age-resource distribution (ri1r) 
1960-61  7.85  6.41  5.78  5.97 
1972-73  11.06  9.87  9.43  9.57 
1984-86  6.29  5.01  4.51  4.61 
1987-90  5.23  3.86  3.29  3.38 
Consumption propensity (as) 
1960-61  7.85  4.40  7.36  5.30 
1972-73  12.88  9.87  12.36  10.29 
1984-86  5.07  1.57  4.51  2.33 
1987-90  6.23  2.71  5.50  3.38 
Resources-to-output ratio (RIY) 
1960-61  7.85  12.19  5.41  6.70 
1972-73  5.36  9.87  2.82  4.16 
1984-86  6.99  11.39  4.51  5.82 
1987-90  4.60  9.16  2.03  3.38 
Age distribution (PiIP) 
1960-61  7.85  9.60  9.01  8.57 
1972-73  7.97  9.87  9.23  8.69 
1984-86  2.93  4.89  4.51  3.85 
1987-90  2.44  4.24  4.01  3.38 
Addendum  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Actual ratios' 
RIY  14.56  13.66  15.06  14.80 
HWIY  11.91  10.64  11.70  11.38 
NHWIY  3.69  3.20  3.21  3.18 
PW/Y  1.45  1.54  1.82  1.78 
GAIY  2.49  1.73  1.67  1.54 
Source: Authors' calculations,  using the data sources for tables 5 and 6. 
a. See table 7.  note a. for organization of this table. 
b. See table 7,  note b, for definitions of variables shown. 
saving rate exercises  are quite similar to those reported in table 7.  The 
second  panel  of  table  17  shows  that the  saving  rate would  be  5.52 
percent if the consumption  propensities  of  1987-90  were replaced by 
those of  1960-61.  This is a bigger effect  than under the base case.  The 
reason  is  that  lower  spending  on  medicare  and medicaid  under the 
balanced budget scenario reduces the resources of the middle-aged  and 
elderly  in  1987-90  and raises  their consumption  propensities.  Also, ON 
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Table 17. The Effect on the Net National  Saving Rate of Counterfactual  Factor 
Values-Balanced  Federal Budget  by 2002a 
Percent 
Factor and period of 
Period of counterfactualfactor  value 
counterfactual saving rate  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Age-resource distribution (rilr) 
1960-61  7.85  6.23  5.59  5.59 
1972-73  11.10  9.87  9.45  9.41 
1984-86  5.89  4.72  4.51  4.40 
1987-90  4.98  3.73  3.50  3.38 
Consumption propensity (ar,) 
1960-61  7.85  4.82  7.94  6.19 
1972-73  12.65  9.87  12.54  10.75 
1984-86  4.56  1.33  4.51  2.64 
1987-90  5.52  2.24  5.21  3.38 
Resources-to-output ratio (RIY) 
1960-61  7.85  12.00  4.85  6.06 
1972-73  5.58  9.87  2.46  3.72 
1984-86  7.54  11.71  4.51  5.73 
1987-90  5.25  9.57  2.12  3.38 
Addendum  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Actual ratios" 
RIY  12.50  11.77  13.03  12.82 
HWIY  11.45  10.38  11.59  11.31 
NHWIY  3.69  3.20  3.21  3.18 
PW/Y  0.95  1.10  1.37  1.36 
GAIY  3.59  2.92  3.14  3.02 
Source: Authors' calculations,  using data sources for tables 5 and 16. 
a. See table 7, note a, for organization of this table. 
b. See table 7, note b, for definitions of variables shown. 
relative to the base case,  post- 1990 reductions in federal health outlays 
have a smaller effect  on the resources of most middle-aged  and elderly 
generations  in  1960-61.  Consequently,  the increases  in the consump- 
tion  propensities  of  these  age  groups  associated  with  the  alternative 
fiscal  policy  are larger for the late  1980s  than they  are for the early 
1960s.  This,  in turn, means that substituting consumption propensities 
from the early  1960s for those of the late  1980s has a larger effect  on 
saving rates. 
Replacing  the  age-resource  distribution  of  1987-90  with  that  of 
1960-61  results in a saving rate of 4.98  percent, which is very close  to 
the  base  case  rate  of  4.97  percent  (table  7).  Applying  the  ratio  of 370  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, I. 1996 
resources to output of 1960-61  in the period 1987-90  results in a saving 
rate of  5.25  percent.  This  increase  is  less  than that in the base  case 
because,  in this case,  the aggregate generational account component of 
the resources-to-output  ratio only falls  from 3.59  to 3.02  over the pe- 
riod,  instead of from 3.56  to 2.88. 
Bias from Error in Measuring Resources 
Given income uncertainty, our preferred resource measure would be 
expected,  rather than  actual  realized,  resources.  But,  as  indicated 
above, our measure of a cohort's resources is not exactly actual realized 
resources.  In fact,  it  is  based  partly on  the  cohort's  actual  realized 
future income  streams and partly on projections of its income  streams 
from the mid-1990s  onward.  Assuming  that our method of projecting 
cohorts'  future incomes  properly captures cohorts'  own  expectations 
about future incomes,  we would expect the error in measuring expected 
resources to be smaller in the later periods than in the earlier periods. 
Since  the measurement error we introduce by using  actual incomes  is 
an expectation error, it has a mean of zero. Thus its presence will impart 
an upward bias to our measurement of average propensities to consume, 
because  of Jensen's  inequality  and the fact that this error shows  up in 
the denominator of the APC formula. And since this bias is likely to be 
greater in the earlier period than in the later period, our analysis likely 
understates the relative importance of rising APCs over time to reducing 
U.S.  saving rates. 
Myopic Expectations 
Our measure of a cohort's  resources in a given  period assumes that 
members  of  the cohort,  on  average,  accurately foresaw  the nonasset 
income  that they would receive  and the net taxes that they would pay 
through 1993.  In addition, the measure assumes that their expectations 
of nonasset income and net taxes after 1993 correspond, on average, to 
the values  that we  project.  These  assumptions  may,  of course,  be in- 
valid. 
An alternative  is to assume  myopic  expectations  concerning  future 
nonasset income and net taxes.  Under this case,  we assume that cohorts 
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same  net taxes  at future ages  as do cohorts  of  the same  sex  at those 
ages currently, except for an adjustment for growth; that is, we assume 
that cohorts expect the current cross-sectional  age-nonasset  income and 
age-net  tax profiles  to  shift  proportionally  through time  due to eco- 
nomic growth,  but not to twist. 
The rate of economic  growth projected for each period is assumed 
to equal the average growth rate of output per hour over the ten years 
before the period.  Thus the growth rate is 2.79  percent for  1960-61, 
2.71  percent for 1972-73,  1.09 percent for 1984-86,  and 1.03 percent 
for  1987-90.  Table  18 shows  total resources  for different age groups 
under myopic  expectations.  For all except  the youngest  generations, 
total  resources  are somewhat  lower  under myopic  expectations  than 
under the base case  (tables 3 and 4).27 
Table  19  shows  that when  resources  are computed  under the  as- 
sumption of myopic  expectations,  the base case conclusions  from our 
counterfactual saving rate experiments are sustained for changes in the 
age-resource distribution and the resources-to-output ratio. Substituting 
the age-resource  distribution  of  1960-61  in place of  that of  1987-90 
produces  a  saving  rate of  5.05  percent  under myopic  expectations, 
compared  to  4.97  percent  in  the  base  case.  Using  the  resources-to- 
output ratio of  1960-61  instead of that of  1987-90  produces a saving 
rate of  6.77  percent,  which  is even  higher than the 5.90  percent rate 
under the base case.  The same experiment with consumption propens- 
ities produces a saving rate of 3.44  percent under myopic expectations, 
which is only slightly  larger than the actual saving rate of 3.38  percent. 
27.  Levels  of human wealth for both male and female working generations are higher 
for the 1960-61  period under myopic expectations  than under the base case.  This results 
from the high  growth  rate used  to compute  1960-61  human wealth  under myopic  ex- 
pectations,  relative to the actual growth of labor income in subsequent years. The actual 
growth  of  pension  income  in later years,  however,  was  more rapid than that used  to 
form pension  wealth under myopic  expectations.  In addition,  the generational accounts 
of all cohorts are much higher in 1960-61  under myopic expectations,  primarily because 
the creation  and growth  of  the  medicare  and medicaid  programs were excluded  when 
forming myopic generational accounts for that period. For the 1960-61  period, the lower 
cohort  pension  wealth  and  higher  generational  accounts  more  than offset  the  higher 
cohort  human  wealth  for  all  except  the  youngest  generations.  For  1987-90,  cohort 
pension and human wealth are not much different under myopic expectations,  compared 
to the base case.  Detailed  data on the components  of resources under myopic  expecta- 
tions are available  from the authors upon request. ON  It  kf  t r--  cn  r  -OC  1 
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Table 19. The Effect on the Net National  Saving Rate of Counterfactual  Factor 
Values-Myopic  Expectationsa 
Percent 
Factor and period of 
Period of counterfactualfactor  value 
counterfactual saving rate  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Age-resource distribution (ri/r) 
1960-61  7.85  7.45  4.68  4.75 
1972-73  10.01  9.87  7.22  7.25 
1984-86  5.89  6.07  4.51  4.48 
1987-90  5.05  5.26  3.41  3.38 
Consumption propensity (a,) 
1960-61  7.85  13.03  9.44  8.10 
1972-73  4.30  9.87  5.78  4.19 
1984-86  2.90  8.19  4.51  2.97 
1987-90  3.44  8.58  4.89  3.38 
Resources-to-output ratio (RIY) 
1960-61  7.85  2.40  3.71  4.54 
1972-73  14.81  9.87  11.06  11.81 
1984-86  8.62  3.21  4.51  5.33 
1987-90  6.77  1.20  2.54  3.38 
Addendum  1960-61  1972-73  1984-86  1987-90 
Actual ratios" 
RIY  11.97  12.89  12.67  12.53 
HWIY  12.27  13.04  11.28  11.24 
NHWIY  3.69  3.20  3.21  3.18 
PW/Y  0.55  0.91  1.23  1.29 
GAIY  4.54  4.26  3.05  3.17 
Source: Authors' calculations, using data sources for tables 5 and 18. 
a. See table 7. note a, for organization of this table. 
b. See table 7, note b, for definitions of variables shown. 
Bequests  and Inter Vivos Transfers 
Our life  cycle  framework ignores  inherited resources and resources 
received  through inter vivos  gifts.  If we had data on cohorts'  expected 
future receipts of inheritances and gifts,  we would include their present 
expected  value in our measure of resources.  This would lower cohorts' 
measured propensities  to consume,  particularly for young and middle- 
aged cohorts whose  parents and grandparents are still alive,  but would 
raise the aggregate ratio of resources to income. 
If,  as we  suspect,  bequests  and inter vivos  transfers have been de- 
clining  over time in the United States,  relative to the size of the econ- 374  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
omy,  our failure to include the present expected  value of future inher- 
itances  and gifts  in measured resources  would  mean that propensities 
to consume  are biased upward by more in the earlier periods than they 
are in  later periods.  Consequently,  we  may  overstate  the  degree  to 
which the consumption  propensities  of the young and the middle-aged 
have  declined  and  understate  the  degree  to  which  the  consumption 
propensities  of  older Americans  have increased.  We may also  under- 
state the degree to which the age-resource profile has tilted toward the 
elderly.  Finally,  we  may overstate the degree to which the resources- 
to-output ratio has risen. 
Accounting for  Uncertainty 
An obvious  criticism  of  our analysis  is that it ignores the fact that 
consumption  decisions  are made under uncertainty. As Angus  Deaton 
and Carroll point out, propensities  to consume out of certain resources 
will,  in general,  exceed  those out of uncertain resources.28 This is only 
true in general, because there are utility functions,  specifically quadratic 
and constant  absolute  risk aversion  functions,  for which  current con- 
sumption  is  a linear function  of  the present expected  value  of  future 
resources. 
But even  if utility  is of  a different form than quadratic or constant 
absolute risk aversion (for example,  isoelastic),  one can still define the 
propensity  to consume  out of total expected  resources.  The difference 
is that this propensity to consume  will  depend on the degree of uncer- 
tainty that consumers  face.  It follows  that the changes  in propensities 
to consume out of expected resources that we have reported may reflect 
changes in the degree of resource uncertainty. This, indeed, is the point 
we argue above,  when relating the rise in the propensity of the elderly 
to consume  to the increased annuitization of their resources. 
Furthermore, uncertainty (for example,  in the context  of  isoelastic 
preferences) requires one to think somewhat differently about our coun- 
terfactual saving  rate experiments.  In addition to all the other factors 
that these  experiments  implicitly  hold  constant,  they  should  also  be 
understood to hold constant the degree of resource uncertainty. 
Considerations  of uncertainty, however,  do not alter our conclusion 
that the government's  intergenerational redistribution has been the ma- 
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jor cause of the postwar decline  in U.S.  saving.  Although this redistri- 
bution has undoubtedly  altered the nature and degree  of resource un- 
certainty,  government policy  has produced a major systematic  change 
in the distribution of expected  resources among current and future gen- 
erations.  This intergenerational redistribution of resources would pro- 
duce a predicted decline  in national saving in any life cycle model,  with 
or without uncertainty. Indeed,  since the social  insurance policies  that 
have effected  the redistribution are likely,  on balance,  to have raised, 
rather than lowered,  consumption  propensities,  the effect  of these pol- 
icies  on U.S.  saving rates is probably understated by our findings that 
focus on changes over time in the age-resource distribution and the ratio 
of resources to output. 
Do Future Resources  Affect Consumption? 
A final concern  is whether,  in our analysis,  cohorts are consuming 
in accordance with the life cycle model. There is a voluminous literature 
testing the life cycle  model,  most of which seems to be highly suppor- 
tive.  Can our data also be used to test this model? The answer appears 
to be no. 
The tests that immediately  come  to mind involve  regressing  cohort 
consumption against variables that capture the level,  composition,  and 
timing of cohort resources.  The life cycle model under certainty predicts 
that the level,  but neither the composition  nor the timing,  of resources 
matters to current consumption.  This point can be seen in the following 
linear model of cohort consumption: 
(10)  cj, =  h(i)  +  g(i)ri,, 
where h(i) and g(i) are functions of age, and g(i) represents the marginal 
propensity to consume  out of resources.  This model  is appropriate if, 
first, there is no uncertainty; second,  preferences  are identical  across 
cohort members; and third, preferences are either homothetic,  or quad- 
ratic,  or exhibit  constant  absolute  risk aversion.29 In this case,  since 
consumption  depends  on  resources  only  through ri,,  regressing  con- 
sumption  on  a polynomial  in  age  and the  components  of  resources 
(human wealth,  net wealth,  pension  wealth,  and the generational  ac- 
count) interacted with a polynomial  in age will yield the same propen- 
29.  The function h(i)  is equal to zero if preferences  are homothetic. 376  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1.1996 
sity to consume  out of  each  component  of resources.  Furthermore, if 
one  decomposes  those  components  of  resources  that involve  present 
values  into  a current flow  and the present value  of  future flows,  the 
propensities  to consume  out of the current flows and the present value 
of  future  flows  will  be  identical.  For  example,  if  human wealth  is 
divided into current labor earnings and the present value of future labor 
earnings,  the propensity to consume  out of current labor earnings will 
equal the propensity to consume out of the present value of future labor 
earnings. 
Although  testing  the equality  of  marginal propensities  to consume 
out of the various components  of resources seems  simple enough,  one 
practical  difficulty  of  a cohort data set  is that the components  of  re- 
sources are, themselves,  nonlinear functions of age and other data, and 
therefore are highly  colinear.  Current labor earnings,  for example,  is 
large and positive  at young and middle ages and essentially  zero at older 
ages;  so this variable has a definite  pattern with age.  Furthermore, if 
the cross-sectional  age-earnings  profile is fairly smooth between  ages 
eighteen  and sixty-five,  the current earnings for all cohorts under age 
sixty-five  at a point in time will be proportional to a polynomial  in age. 
As a second example,  the present value of future social security benefits 
(excluding  current benefits)  also  has a definite pattern with age;  it is 
small  for young  cohorts  that are years away from collecting  benefits, 
large  for  middle-aged  cohorts  that  are approaching  retirement,  and 
small  for  old  cohorts  that are approaching their maximum  lifespan. 
Moreover,  although variables such as current earnings and the present 
value of future social  security benefits exhibit variation over time,  our 
data set contains  only four periods. 
Without the assumption of certainty, the difficulty in using our data 
to  test  the  life  cycle  model  is compounded.  First,  if preferences  are 
neither quadratic nor exhibit  constant absolute risk aversion,  the pro- 
pensity  to consume  out of resources will  depend not only  on age,  but 
also  on the composition  of resources,  in terms of those that are safe, 
like current net worth, and those that are risky,  like future labor earn- 
ings.30 Since we do not know the form of this dependence,  we have no 
30.  More precisely,  the propensity  to consume  will  depend  on the amount of  safe 
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way to control for it when testing for equality of marginal propensities 
to consume. 
If preferences  are quadratic or exhibit  constant absolute  risk aver- 
sion,  consumption  is  linear  in the  expected  value  of  resources,  and 
therefore the propensity  to consume  depends only  on age.  But in our 
model,  the present value  of  the variable for future flows  of resources 
incorporates the actual realized  values  of  these  flows,  rather than the 
expected  values.  Consequently,  our present-value  realized  resource 
components  will differ from their expected-value  counterparts by com- 
ponent-specific  expectation errors. Hence our use of realized rather than 
expected  resources  in  a consumption  regression  introduces  classical 
measurement error in the variables.  This problem will contaminate not 
only the coefficients  on the present values of future resource flows,  but 
also  the coefficients  on current flows.  Indeed,  one  can show  that the 
coefficients  on current flows  will  be biased upward. Thus coefficients 
on current flows  may be much larger than those on the present values 
of future flows not because cohorts ignore the future or fail to optimize 
intertemporally, but simply because current flows are, in part, proxying 
for expected  future flows. 
In principle,  one  can instrument the variables  measured with error 
to  avoid  these  biases.  Lagged  income  variables,  such  as  a cohort's 
lagged  labor  earnings,  represent  natural instruments  since  they  are, 
presumably,  correlated with individuals'  expected  future incomes  but 
not with their expectation  errors. However,  the orthogonality of lagged 
incomes  and expectation  errors is a time-series  property, and we have 
only four time-series  observations. 
Notwithstanding  this litany of  admonitions,  table 20 presents mar- 
ginal propensities  to consume  out of  alternative resource  variables at 
ages twenty,  forty, sixty,  and eighty,  as predicted by four ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions,  estimated separately for males and females. 
Each regression  includes  an intercept,  age,  age  squared, and a third- 
order polynomial  in age interacted with each of the resource variables. 
Regression  1 considers  only  total resources; as indicated,  marginal 
consumption  propensities  are flat at around 6 percent  for males  and 
females through age sixty,  and rise to 10 percent for males and 8 percent 
for females  at age eighty.  Regression  2 breaks total resources into net 
worth,  human wealth,  pension  wealth,  and the generational  account. 378  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1.1996 
Table  20. Marginal Propensities  to Consume  Out of Specified  Resource  Components  at 
Selected Agesa 
Genier-a-  Curr-enit  Curten t  Cu4rrenit  Fututre 
Sex an1d  Total  Net  Hulmnani  Pensioni  tional  humalnatI  penision  n1et  hIum71atI 
Equationi  age  resources  wvor-th  wealth  wealtlh  account  wealth  wealth  taxes  wvealtl 
Males 
1  20  0.06  .2..  . . 0.  .  .1.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ... 
40  0.06  .2..  .0..  .0..  .1  .  .  .  .  .  .  ..  .. 
60  0.06  . 0.0.  .  .0.  .-.0.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ... 
80  0.10  ...  .0..  .4.  .1  ...  ...  .  ...  ... 
2  20  .  .  .  0.23  0.09  0.14  -0.18  ...  .  .  .  .  .  0... 
40  .  .  .  0.22  0.07  0.02  -0.15  ...  .  .  .  .  .  0... 
60  .  .  .  0.12  0.00  -0.01  -0.07  . ..  ...  .  .  -0... 
80  .  .  .  0.  .02  0.40  -0.  .  .  .  -1.12  .29  .2..  ... 
3  20  .  .  .  0.07  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.50  -02.19  1.12  0.18 
40  .  .  .  0.05  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.10  -0.59  0.70  0.09 
60  .  .  .  -  0.02  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.38  1.87  0.25  -  0.05 
80  .  .  .  -  0.11  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -  1.12  2.29  1.29  -  0.05 
4  20  .  .  .  -  0.034  .  .  0.0  .  .  .  .  .25  .  .  .  0.05 
40  .  .  .  -0.21  ...  ...  ...  -0.02  1.21  .  .  .  0.02 
60  .  .  .  0.02  .07  .0..  .1..  0.17  2.37  .  .  .  0.24 
80  .  .  .  -0.62  ...  ...  .-..  -  1.65  1.25  .  .  .  1.02 
Females 
1  20  0.06  .0.0.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -  .  .4  .  .0  . 
40  0.06  .0.0.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  ...  ...  ...  ... 
60  0.05  .0..  .  .  ..  . .  .  ....  1.0  3.0  0.  ... 
80  0.08  .02  ...  ..  ....  0.  .40  0.1  0.1 
2  20  .  .  .  0.04  0.0  1  0.49  0.07  .  .  .  .  -.5  .  .  .  .08 
40  . ..  0.05  0.02  0.27  -  0.02  . ..  . ..  . ..  . .  . 
60  . ..  0.02  0.07  0.00  - 0.  12  . ..  . ..  . ..  ..  . 
80  . ..  -0.04  0.10  0.35  -0.07  . ..  . ..  . ..  ..  . 
3  20  ...  0.00  ...  .  .  .  .  .  .  -  0.04  4.20  -  0.09  -  0.0  1 
40  . ..  0.00  . ..  . ..  . ..  0.5  1  4.42  - 0.32  0.00 
60  . ..  0.00  . ..  . ..  . ..  1.00  3.03  - 0.36  - 0.01 
80  . ..  -0.02  . ..  . ..  . ..  0.74  2.40  0.14  - 0.  10 
4  20  . ..  - 0.09  . ..  . ..  . ..  -  1.55  -  1.58  . ..  0.08 
40  .  .  .  -0.13  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.97  -  1.39  ...  -0.06 
60  .  .  .  -0.13  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -0.86  0.42  ...  -0.37 
80  .  .  .  -  0.11  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  -  3.84  3.69  ...  -  0.78 Jagadeesh  Gokhale,  Laurence  J.  Kotlikoff, and John Sabelhaus  379 
Table  20. (continued) 
Futulre  Cur-renit  Cuirr-enit  Futuire  Future 
pen-  Future  social  mnedicre  Current  Cutrrenit  social  mnedicare  Future  Future 
Sion  niet  securitv  & inedicid  wve/ftire  tax pca-  security  & inedicaid  weftlre  taIX 
weaalth  tcaxes  benefits  beeefits  beniefits  inents  beniefits  beniefits  beniefits  pcaynents 
0.25  . ..  -10.48  -1.12  -2.43  0.73  -0.80  0.29  0.79  -0.03 
0.14  . ..  -3.00  2.26  4.77  2.01  -0.60  0.16  -0.52  -0.10 
0.1 1  .  .  .  8.80  8.72  9.42  4.22  -1I.02  -1I.28  -4.  15  -0.71 
0.57  .  .  1  1.29  16.83  -0.66  7.72  -3.69  -4.94  - 10.31  -2.37 
0.45  0...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
O..  1  0...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
-.20  -00  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
O. 10  -0.310  .  ..  .  ..  .  ..  .  ..  .  ..  .  ..  .  ..  ..  . 
-0.33  . . .  19.17  0.06  13.72  5.08  -0.37  0.01  -0.58  -0.27 
-0.22  . . .  14.49  3.01  7.57  4.27  0.10  0.47  -0.49  0.01 
-0.03  . . .  6.101  7.01  2.30  2.82  0.80  1.01  2.14  0.45 
-0.11  . . .  14.17  10.23  18.71  5.99  1.10  1.30  9.18  0.63 
Source: Authors' calculations,  using the data sources for tables 5 and 6. 
a. The dependent variable is consumption (ci,).  Each regression includes an intercept, age,  age sqluared,  and a third-ordier 
polynomial in age interacted with each of the resource variables that appear in the table. 380  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
Although an F test strongly rejects equality of marginal propensities to 
consume  out of these components  of resources,  certain results (such as 
the generally  negative  predicted marginal propensities to consume  out 
of the generational  account) provide support for the life cycle  model. 
This support evaporates when we further disaggregate the four main 
components  of  resources  and the components  of  the generational  ac- 
count into current flows  and the present value of future flows  (regres- 
sions 3 and 4, respectively).  As the table shows,  both the signs and the 
magnitudes of calculated  marginal propensities  to consume  are highly 
sensitive  to the precise  combination  of  variables that are included  in 
the regressions.  These  basic  findings also pertain to regressions  using 
data constructed  under the  assumptions  of  3  and 9  percent  discount 
rates; data constructed using simple,  rather than actuarial, discounting; 
and data  constructed  under the  assumption  of  myopic  expectations. 
Finally,  the findings also pertain to instrumented regressions,  using as 
instruments age and age squared interacted with six lagged values each 
of per capita labor earnings,  pension benefits,  social  security benefits, 
and other per capita taxes and transfers.3' 
From these results we must conclude  that our data are not up to the 
task of testing the life cycle  model.  This does not, however,  invalidate 
their  use  for  the  main  purpose  of  this  study,  namely,  decomposing 
changes  over time in U.S.  saving rates. 
Implications of Projected Demographic Change for Future 
U.S.  Saving Rates 
One  final  issue  is  the  prognosis  for  U.S.  saving  rates in  light  of 
projected  demographic  change.  To  consider  this  issue,  we  use  the 
consumption  propensities,  relative resource profiles,  and resources-to- 
output ratios of the late  1980s to calculate the national saving rate for 
alternative projections  of the future age structure of the population. 
Table 21  shows  that, all else  equal,  projected changes  in the popu- 
lation structure will  produce a further decline  in the U.S.  saving rate. 
The projected rate for 2000  is only  1.7 percent. Over the period 2000- 
20,  the  saving  rate will  oscillate  around this  value.  But  after 2020, 
3 1.  We do not have  lagged  values  of  resource flows  on a generation-specific  basis 
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Table 21. The Effect of Demographic  Change 
Percent 
Year  Saving rate  Year  Saving rate 
1995  2.1  2025  1.4 
2000  1.7  2030  1.3 
2005  1.7  2035  1.3 
2010  1.9  2040  1.3 
2015  1.9  2045  1.3 
2020  1.7  2050  1.3 
Source: Authors' calculations,  using the data sources for tables 5 and 6. 
when the baby boom generation has completely  retired, the saving rate 
is predicted to decline  to  1.3 percent. 
Conclusion 
This paper traces the dramatic postwar decline in U.S.  saving to two 
factors: government redistribution from current young and future gen- 
erations to current older ones,  and a sharp increase in the propensity of 
older Americans to consume out of their remaining lifetime  resources. 
Absent these factors, the current U.S.  rate of national saving would be 
roughly three and a half times  as large.  The increase in the resources 
of the elderly  relative  to those of  younger generations,  as well  as the 
increase  in their propensity to consume  out of their resources has pro- 
duced  a  remarkable  increase  in  their  relative  consumption.  Today, 
seventy-year-olds  are consuming,  on average,  roughly one-fifth  more 
than thirty-year-olds;  in the early 1960s,  they were consuming  slightly 
more than two-thirds as much. The increase in the relative consumption 
of  the  elderly  is  dramatic  even  if  one  considers  only  nonmedical 
consumption. 
The fact that propensities to consume were not systematically  larger, 
and indeed,  were smaller for most young and middle-aged  cohorts,  in 
the late 1980s than in the early 1960s indicates that "spendthrift"  young 
and middle-aged  Americans  are not to blame for the decline  in U.S. 
saving.  This  is not to say that young  and middle-aged  Americans  are 
saving  enough.  Given  the  severe  imbalance  in  long-run  U.S.  fiscal 
policy,  these  groups need to save  significant  amounts simply  to safe- 382  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1996 
guard themselves  against future tax increases or reductions in transfer 
payments.  32 
Since there is every reason to believe  that intergenerational redistri- 
bution will continue apace in the United States, at least through the turn 
of this century,  there is every reason to believe  that U.S.  saving rates 
will remain extremely  low,  if they do not decline even further. Anemic 
rates of  saving  will  spell  anemic  rates of  domestic  investment,  labor 
productivity  growth,  and real wage  growth.  This  is the legacy  of  the 
uncontrolled  intergenerational redistribution from young  savers to old 
spenders that has been fueling  ever-higher rates of consumption  in the 
United States. 
APPENDIX  A 
Data Construction 
IN ALLOCATING  income,  taxes,  and benefits to household  members,  we 
distribute  various  income,  tax,  and transfer aggregates  according  to 
age-sex  relative profiles obtained from various microeconomic  surveys 
described below.  Two methods are followed  in constructing the relative 
profiles for the various types of payments and receipts. In both methods, 
children's  amounts are attributed equally to the head and the spouse (if 
present).  In the  primary method,  nominal  receipts  and payments  by 
married individuals are divided equally between the head and the spouse 
before  averaging  within each age-sex  category.  This is done for labor 
income,  all tax payments,  and all benefit receipts except  for medicare 
and medicaid-which  are in-kind benefits  and cannot be shared with 
the spouse.  The  other method  involves  allocating  the amounts to the 
nominal recipient before averaging within each age-sex  category.  The 
detailed description of data sources and construction that follows  should 
be read with these  alternative methods of allocating  payments and re- 
ceipts  within the household  in mind. 
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Labor Income 
Aggregate  labor  income  between  1960  and  1993  is  calculated  as 
labor's  share of national income  as reported in the NIPA.  For each of 
these  years,  labor's  share of  national  income  is  calculated  under the 
assumption  that it is the same as its share of proprietorship income.33 
Relative profiles of labor income by age and sex are calculated for each 
year between  1963 and 1993, using CPS data. The 1963 profile is used 
to distribute aggregate  labor income  for earlier years.  Per capita labor 
income  for years beyond  1993 is projected under the assumption that, 
except  for an adjustment for growth,  cohorts  of  a given  age  and sex 
earn the same average  labor income  in future years as cohorts of that 
age and sex  earned in  1993.  For example,  males  who  are aged 50  in 
years  after  1993  are assumed  to earn the  same  amount,  on  average, 
apart from an adjustment for growth,  as males  who  were  aged 50  in 
1993. The growth adjustment is 1.2 percent per year. Thus the projected 
average earnings of males aged fifty in 1996 equals the average earnings 
of males aged fifty in  1993 multiplied by (1.012)3. 
Pension  Benefits 
Pension benefits include private pension benefits, workers' compen- 
sation,  veterans' benefits,  and government employee  pension benefits. 
Aggregate private pension benefits for the years 1960-88  are taken from 
Park (1992).  In this case,  we use the NIPA estimates primarily because 
estimates  based on administrative reports are generally  deemed  more 
reliable  than those based on household  surveys.  The estimates  for the 
years through 2030  are derived by assuming  that the ratio of pension 
benefits  to GDP remains at its  1988 level.  Actual GDP through  1993 
and unpublished  GDP projections  made by the Office of Management 
and Budget  (OMB)  through the year 2030  are used to extrapolate ag- 
gregate private pension benefits into the future. The aggregates for the 
other three types of benefits through 1993 are taken from SCB,  and the 
33.  The  share  of  labor  income  in  national  income  is  +,  where  +  satisfies  C  + 
4PI  =  4NL.  In this  equation,  C  is  compensation  paid  to  employees  less  employer 
contributions to employee  pension plans, PI is proprietorship income,  and NI is national 
income.  The calculated  values  of  +  are quite stable over the period  1960-92,  ranging 
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same procedure is used to extrapolate these aggregates through the year 
2030. 
The relative profiles for all four types of pensions are computed from 
the March CPS for the years 1972-93.  This survey contains information 
on various types of pension  income,  including company or union pen- 
sions,  workers' compensation,  veterans' benefits,  and government em- 
ployee  pensions,  and receipts  from annuities and other regular contri- 
butions.  For all categories,  retirement, disability  and survivor benefits 
are included.  The  1972 profile is used to distribute the aggregates  in 
earlier years,  and the  1993  profile is used  to distribute the projected 
aggregates  through 2030.  For years after 2030,  it is assumed that real 
average pension benefits for a given age and sex equal their 2030 values 
adjusted for growth at an annual rate of  1.2 percent, as assumed in the 
base case. 
Social  Security Benefits 
Aggregate  social  security benefits between  1960 and 1993 are those 
reported in the NIPA.  For the years between  1993 and 2030,  we  use 
unpublished  projections  (on a NIPA  basis)  provided by the Office  of 
Management  and Budget.  Relative  profiles of  social  security benefits 
by age and sex,  obtained from the CPS for the years 1968-93,  are used 
to  distribute  aggregate  benefits  in those  years.  Aggregate  benefits  in 
earlier years are distributed according to the relative profiles for 1968, 
and the OMB's  projected benefits for the years  1994 through 2030  are 
distributed according to the relative profiles for 1993. Per capita benefits 
by age and sex beyond the year 2030 equal those in that year, adjusted 
for productivity  growth at an annual rate of  1.2 percent. 
Medicare  and Medicaid Benefits 
Aggregate medicare and medicaid payments are reported in the NIPA 
from  the  inception  of  these  programs through  1993.  The  OMB  has 
provided us with unpublished projections (on a NIPA basis) of aggre- 
gate medicare payments  for the years  1994 through 2030.  In the case 
of  medicaid,  we  apply the OMB's  projected annual growth rates for 
grants in aid to state and local governments between  1994 and 2030  to 
the aggregate value of medicaid for 1993 from the NIPA. For each year 
beyond  2030,  total medicare and medicaid payments to individuals  of Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence  J. Kotlikoff,  and John Sabelhaus  385 
a given age and sex are calculated by multiplying the projected number 
of individuals of that age and sex for the year by the per capita level  of 
benefits  to individuals  of  that age and sex  in 2030,  adjusted for post- 
2030  growth in the level  of per capita benefits (using  the  1.2 percent 
productivity growth rate of the base case).  Relative profiles of medicaid 
benefits are based on HCFA data on average benefits by age and sex. 
Relative profiles of medicare benefits are based on data from McClellan 
and Skinner (1996). 
Unemployment Insurance,  Aid to Families  with Dependent 
Children,  Food  Stamps, and General  Welfare Benefits 
Aggregate  values  of these  federal,  state,  and local  transfers are re- 
ported in the NIPA.  General welfare benefits include federal black lung 
benefits,  state  general  assistance,  state  energy  assistance,  education 
benefits,  and other federal,  state,  and local transfers. The age-sex  rel- 
ative profiles used to distribute these benefits are obtained from March 
CPS  data  on  public  assistance  for  the  years  1972  and  1993.  These 
relative profiles are used to distribute their respective  aggregate expen- 
ditures for each year between  1960 and 1993,  and the 1972 profiles are 
used to distribute benefits in the years before  1972.  For future years, 
we assume that the age- and sex-specific  values of each type of transfer 
payment keep pace with productivity growth of  1.2 percent. 
Labor Income Taxes 
Aggregate  federal,  state,  and local  income  taxes  for  1960 through 
1993 are reported in the NIPA.  For 1993 through 2030,  we use unpub- 
lished projections of federal income tax revenues provided by the OMB. 
State and local  income  taxes  for  1993 through 2030  are projected by 
using the OMB's  unpublished  forecast of GDP and assuming  that the 
ratio of state and local  income  taxes to GDP in 1993 prevails between 
1993 and 2030. 
Aggregate  labor  income  taxes  in  each  year  are calculated  as  the 
product of total federal,  state, and local income taxes and labor's share 
of national income.  We distribute aggregate labor income taxes on the 
basis of the CPS profiles of labor income described above. For the years 
after 2030,  we assume that age- and sex-specific  values of labor income 
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Payroll  Taxes 
The  NIPA  reports  aggregate  values  of  payroll  taxes  from  1960 
through 1993. The OMB has provided us with projections of aggregate 
federal payroll taxes from 1994 through 2030.  Aggregate state and local 
payroll taxes  for 1994 through 2030  are calculated on the basis of the 
OMB's  projection of GDP between  1994 and 2030  and the assumption 
that the ratio of  state and local  payroll taxes to GDP in  1993 prevails 
through  2030.  Aggregate  payroll  taxes  in  the  years  1960-2030  are 
distributed by age and sex,  according to CPS profiles of covered earn- 
ings  (that is,  labor earnings  subject  to  social  security  payroll  taxes) 
from 1963 through 1993.~4 Age- and sex-specific  values of payroll taxes 
beyond  2030  are assumed  to equal their values  in 2030,  adjusted for 
growth at 1.2 percent. 
Excise  and Sales  Taxes 
The NIPA is our source for aggregate excise  tax (including property 
tax)  and  sales  tax  revenue  from  1960  through  1993.  For the  period 
1994-2030,  we use unpublished projections of federal excise  and sales 
tax revenues provided by the OMB. State and local excise  and sales tax 
revenues  between  1994 and 2030  are calculated  by using the ratio of 
these  revenues  to GDP in  1993 and applying the OMB's  unpublished 
forecasts  of GDP through 2030. 
Age-sex  relative profiles of excise  and sales taxes are calculated from 
the 1960-61,  1972-73,  1984-86,  and 1987-90  CEXs. Separate profiles 
are constructed for tobacco,  alcohol,  property taxes,  and all other sales 
and excise  taxes.  The  1960-61  profiles  are used for the years before 
1966; the  1972-73  profiles  are used for the years  1967 through 1978; 
the 1984-86  profiles are used for the years 1979 through 1986; and the 
1987-90  profiles are used for 1987 and beyond.  Age-  and sex-specific 
values of sales and excise  taxes beyond 2030 are assumed to equal their 
values  in 2030,  adjusted for growth at 1.2 percent. 
34.  The  data do  not permit the calculation  of  separate profiles  for  state and local 
payroll taxes,  which  are not necessarily  subject to earnings ceilings.  However,  payroll 
taxes  other than social  security  are a small  fraction of  the total (less  than 30  percent), 
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Capital Income Taxes 
Aggregate  capital  income  taxes  between  1960 and 2030  are calcu- 
lated as capital's  share of national income  multiplied by actual or pro- 
jected values of aggregate federal, state, and local income tax revenues. 
Relative profiles for capital income taxes come from the 1962 and 1983 
SCFs.  These  profiles  are based upon weighted  (SCF person weights) 
average net worth holdings,  by age and sex.  This procedure could not 
be applied to individuals over age eighty because of the paucity of data. 
The profile of average net worth holdings by age and sex are smoothed 
and extrapolated  through age  one  hundred using  a fourth-order poly- 
nomial.  Age- and sex-specific  values of capital income taxes after 2030 
are assumed to equal their values  in 2030,  adjusted for growth at 1.2 
percent. 
Nonhuman Wealth 
Age-  and sex-specific  values  of nonhuman wealth for each year be- 
tween  1960 and 1993 are constructed by distributing by age and sex the 
total private net wealth  in that year.  Aggregate  private net wealth for 
these years is reported in the Flow of Funds.35 The relative profiles of 
wealth holding  by age and sex are calculated  with data from the  1963 
and 1983 SCFs.  The  1963 profiles are used for the years before  1963, 
and the 1983 profiles for years after 1983. The profiles for intermediate 
years are constructed by interpolating linearly between the profiles for 
1963 and 1983. 
Determining  Average  Consumption by Age and Sex 
The data used to determine average consumption by age and sex for 
the  years  1960-61,  1972-73,  1984-86,  and  1987-90  are from  the 
NIPA; the  1960-61,  1972-73,  and 1984-90  CEXs; and the  1977 and 
1987 NMESs.  Aggregate  NIPA  household consumption expenditure is 
allocated to adults on the basis of four relative profiles of consumption by 
age and sex-for  the years 1960-61,  1972-73,  1984-86,  and 1987-90. 
To use the 1960-61  CEX, we have to impute particular demographic 
35.  Our aggregates  are net of the Flow of Funds's estimate of the value of residential 
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information  to  its  households.  The  reason  is  that this  CEX  provides 
only  general  indicators  of  the ages  and sexes  of  household  members 
other than the head and spouse.  We impute this information by means 
of a statistical  match with the 1960 decennial  census.  Specifically,  we 
sort the census  data by a set of variables that are also available  in the 
CEX. These include demographic variables such as the number of chil- 
dren under age eighteen,  the ages and sexes  of the household head and 
spouse,  household  income,  the sex and marital status of the household 
head,  an urban versus rural indicator, region,  and housing tenure. For 
each  1960-61  CEX household  with members other than the head and 
spouse,  we randomly select  a census household  from the set of census 
households  with the same matching data. The ages and sexes  of census 
household  members other than the head and spouse are then attributed 
to the CEX household. 
Each of the four age-sex  relative consumption  profiles is formed in 
a similar manner. First,  we divide  the NIPA  consumption  aggregates 
into  thirty-five  separate components.  For most  of  these  components, 
such as clothing,  there are corresponding data in the CEX that can be 
used to distribute the aggregate values of these components.  For three 
components,  imputed rent, financial services,  and expenditures by char- 
itable institutions,  there is no corresponding direct measure in the CEX, 
but there are other variables that can be used for purposes of distribution 
(for example,  house value in the place of imputed rent). However,  there 
is no CEX variable that is comparable to the NIPA's  health care com- 
ponent,  so we use the NMES to distribute health care. 
The second step in forming the age-sex relative consumption profiles 
involves  benchmarking the distribution data to the relevant component 
of the NIPA consumption aggregate.  For example,  we divide the NIPA 
clothing  component  by the total CEX clothing  expenditure,  computed 
using the CEX household weights.  The resulting ratio is used to rescale 
the clothing  expenditure  of  each household  in the CEX.  Clothing  ex- 
penditure is rescaled  separately for each of  CEX surveys  used  in the 
study, based on the contemporaneous value of clothing from the NIPA. 
This  procedure is used to rescale  the CEX data for each of the NIPA 
components  for which there are also direct CEX measures. The rescal- 
ing factors for easily  verified or remembered spending categories,  like 
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for spending on other goods and services,  such as food and alcohol,  are 
generally  underreported by roughly 20 percent.36 
In  the  case  of  imputed  rent,  we  calculate  the  ratio  of  the  NIPA 
aggregate  imputed  rent to  total  CEX  reported house  values  (again, 
computed using  the CEX household  weights).  We then multiply each 
household's  reported house  value  by  this  ratio to  produce  a NIPA- 
benchmarked estimate of the household's  imputed rent. This procedure 
is also used in the case of financial services,  expenditures by charitable 
institutions,  clothing provided by the military, net foreign remittances, 
and food produced and consumed  on farms, using,  respectively,  CEX 
reported totals for checking  plus saving accounts,  charitable contribu- 
tions,  number of members in the military, and other consumption,  and 
a dummy variable equal to one if the household owned a farm and equal 
to zero otherwise. 
In the  case  of  health  care expenditure,  we  benchmark the NMES 
data using the five broad components in the NIPA: physician's  services, 
hospital  services,  private  health  insurance,  prescriptions,  and  other 
medical.  Specifically,  we  form the ratio of each of these  components 
to  the  corresponding  NMES  totals  (based  on  the  NMES  population 
weights)  and then rescale  the NMES data on the basis of these ratios. 
We use the  1977 NMES  for the years  1960-61  and 1972-73,  and the 
1987 NMES for the years  1984-86  and 1987-90. 
As the third step in forming the age-sex  relative  consumption  pro- 
files,  we allocate  the rescaled  (NIPA-benchmarked)  actual or imputed 
CEX  data to  individuals  within  the  CEX  household.  (This  was  not 
necessary  for the NMES  data because this survey takes the individual 
as the unit of observation.)  For certain types of expenditure, the method 
of allocation  is fairly clear. For example,  expenditure on boy's clothing 
is divided  evenly  among the household's  male children,  and pipe to- 
bacco is divided  evenly  among the household's  adult males.  For other 
types of expenditure,  we have developed  particular rules. Housing ex- 
penditure,  including  imputed rent, is allocated evenly  to the head and 
spouse.  Food,  vacations,  and other items  of  expenditure  that are not 
readily allocable are divided evenly among the household's  adult equiv- 
36.  See Bosworth,  Burtless,  and Sabelhaus (1991)  for a general comparison of CEX 
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alents, where adults (those aged eighteen and over) have an equivalency 
factor of  1.0,  and children  have  an equivalency  factor that increases 
linearly from 0.3  for newborns to  1.0 for eighteen-year-olds. 
The fourth step entails using the NIPA-benchmarked NMES data to 
calculate  age- and sex-specific  weighted  average values of each of the 
five types of health care expenditure.  These  values  are then attributed 
to individual members of the CEX households,  on the basis of their age 
and sex.  We  also  allocate  to  individual  members of  the CEX house- 
holds,  on the basis  of  their age  and sex,  average values  of  privately 
paid educational  expenditure.  These average values are determined by 
calculating  average elementary and secondary school  expenditures per 
child aged five through eighteen  and average college  expenditures per 
person aged eighteen  through twenty-four. 
In the fifth step,  we reallocate all of the children's expenditure from 
the CEX,  including  the  imputed  health  care expenditure,  evenly  to 
the  head  of  household  and  spouse.  We  then  combine  these  NIPA- 
benchmarked,  actual or imputed CEX data for particular years (1960- 
61,  1972-73,  1984-86,  and 1987-90)  to form the ratio of the average 
value over these years of the total expenditure of adults of a particular 
age and sex to that of forty-year-old  males.  This provides our four age- 
sex relative consumption  profiles. 
We use our four age-sex  relative consumption profiles and our age- 
and sex-specific  population  data to  allocate  total NIPA  consumption 
over the four periods by age and sex.  This may seem  an unnecessary 
second round of benchmarking of aggregate NIPA consumption,  but in 
so  doing,  we  ensure  that our final calculated  values  of  average  con- 
sumption by age and sex are consistent with the census population data 
that we use to calculate age- and sex-specific  values of average remain- 
ing lifetime  resources.  In particular, we  avoid the under- or overesti- 
mates of average age- and sex-specific  consumption that would arise if 
the CEX household  weights  were systematically  too high or too low. Comments 
and Discussion 
Barry  Bosworth:  This  is  a most  interesting  addition to the literature 
on the decline  in the U.S.  saving rate. It is useful both as an illustration 
of the use of generational  accounting  to analyze  saving behavior,  and 
for the clarity of  its conclusions:  namely,  that the decline  in national 
saving is due, first, to a large redistribution of claims on resources from 
the young  and unborn to the old,  and second,  to a marked increase in 
the propensity of the elderly to spend the resources under their control. 
The  analysis  is  somewhat  unconventional  in the focus  on  the na- 
tional,  as opposed  to the private,  saving  rate as the basic  behavioral 
variable. The authors employ a strict version of Ricardian equivalence. 
However,  anyone familiar with Kotlikoff's  mantra about the arbitrary 
nature of current measures of the public budget balance should not be 
surprised. 
First,  the authors develop  a new data set of the age distribution of 
total consumption  that is consistent  with the aggregates of the national 
accounts. The results indicate a dramatic shift in the distribution of total 
consumption  toward the elderly.  Since  1960,  individuals  aged  sixty- 
five and above have seen their real consumption increase at a rate more 
than twice  that of  the population  as a whole.  By  the late  1980s,  the 
consumption  of  the elderly  had grown to the extent that consumption 
per capita was  nearly flat across  age groups (tables  3 and 4).  This  is 
particularly striking given  that the consumption  of the young includes 
the cost of raising their children. 
Second,  the authors develop  another data set on the age distribution 
of aggregate resources.  Resources  consist  of the standard components 
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of human and nonhuman wealth less the generational account as defined 
by Kotlikoff  and others. While these results show a large redistribution 
of resources toward the elderly,  the shift is less than that for consump- 
tion,  which  implies  a significant  rise  in the ratio of  consumption  to 
wealth for the elderly. 
The authors use these data sets to decompose  the change in aggregate 
consumption,  and hence the national saving rate, into the contribution 
of changes  in the age distribution of resources;  age-specific  spending 
propensities  (out of resources);  the age distribution of the population; 
and the government  spending rate. The authors focus  on the consump- 
tion-to-wealth  ratio because  they expect  it to be more stable,  or ame- 
nable to greater interpretation, than the consumption-to-income  ratio. 
While  some of their results are sensitive  to the choice  of a discount 
rate, using  a 6 percent discount rate the decline  in the national saving 




Component  change 
Changes in resources  -4.1 
Overall accumulation  1.5 
Transfers from the unborn to the living  -4.0 
Transfers from the young to the old  -  1.6 
Changes in spending propensities  -1.5 
Old  -2.4 
Young  0.9 
Changes in age distribution  0.9 
Changes in government spending  0.4 
Total  -4.3 
First,  wealth transfers from the unborn (the generational  account)  are 
the overwhelming  source of the decline  in the national saving rate: 4. 1 
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percentage points.2 In fact,  exclusive  of the generational account,  the 
living population has a lower wealth-to-income  ratio than in 1960-61, 
which  should  have  raised the national  saving  rate by  1.5  percentage 
points.  Second,  among the living  population  there is a large redistri- 
bution from the young to the old. However,  despite the large growth in 
their resources, the aged consumed their wealth at a greatly accelerated 
pace during the  period  1987-90,  implicitly  reducing  their bequests. 
The behavior of the aged reminds me of the owner of the Washington 
Redskins  who  complained  that his  manager was  given  an unlimited 
budget and still managed to exceed  it. Were it not for the transfers of 
the wealth  to  the  elderly  and their spending  profligacy,  the  national 
saving rate would have increased by half,  instead of falling  by half. 
Is this a plausible  story? Have the authors explained  the decline  in 
saving?  Certainly  there has  been  a huge  transfer of  resources  to  the 
aged,  but can this really  account for the drop in national saving?  Are 
present definitions  of  public  and private saving  as meaningless  as the 
authors suggest? Everything depends on the quality of the two data sets 
that they develop  and on their model,  in which consumption is related 
to a definition of total resources that embodies  Ricardian equivalence. 
Their data on the age distribution of consumption  differs  from that 
obtained from normal surveys  in three major respects.  First, the Con- 
sumer  Expenditure  Survey  includes  only  out-of-pocket  medical  ex- 
penses,  whereas  the national  accounts  measure both government  and 
insured health care payments in private consumption.  Second,  the sur- 
veys  exclude  imputed  rent on  owner-occupied  housing,  which  is  in- 
cluded in the national accounts.  And third, the ratio of expenditures of 
the  national  accounts  to  the  total  of  the  survey  varies  substantially 
across categories  and time. The authors use the survey data to distribute 
the national accounts data on consumption by age. Separate information 
is used to compute  the age pattern of  medical  care and imputed rent. 
The most  serious  potential  objection  to their procedure lies  in the as- 
sumption  that the errors in the survey responses  are distributed on  a 
proportionate basis-that  those who report zero expenditures do so with 
2.  It is interesting to note that while  the young complain that the old have borrowed 
from the future,  these  data imply that they are doing  the same.  The real losers  are the 
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zero  error. In addition,  the CEX,  as  a source  of  information  on  the 
consumption-income  balance,  is a very low quality data set. 
In an earlier study, Burtless,  Sabelhaus,  and I decided not to use the 
CEX to analyze  saving  behavior after 1986 because  the time series of 
the saving  rate computed  from the  survey  was  uncorrelated with the 
saving  rate of  the  national  accounts.3  Sabelhaus's  own  analysis  also 
showed  large fluctuations in the ratio of the survey aggregates to those 
of the national accounts.  It would be useful if the authors would show, 
beginning  with the survey data, how the successive  adjustments affect 
the age distribution of  consumption.  They do provide  information on 
the role  of  medical  care,  which  is  responsible  for 60  percent of  the 
change  in  the  age  distribution  of  overall  consumption.  It would  be 
useful  to have similar information on the role of imputed rent and the 
coverage adjustments. Their basic conclusion that there has been a large 
shift in the age distribution of  consumption  seems  plausible,  but it is 
basically  a medicare story. 
The calculation of the age distribution of resources seems more ques- 
tionable,  however,  if for no other reason than that the basic survey data 
on wealth are so bad.  Furthermore, while  the shift from a measure of 
income  to a wealth concept  is quite straightforward for labor income, 
it results in an age distribution of tangible capital much different than 
that of capital income  because the rate of return is not the same across 
all types  of  capital.  The accuracy of the age distribution of  wealth  is 
important because  if the shift of consumption toward the elderly  were 
matched by an equally  large shift of resources  among the living,  and 
marginal propensities  were similar, there should be no implication of a 
decline  in saving. 
I am left with two major sources of doubt as to whether the authors 
have really provided a causal explanation for the decline in the national 
saving  rate.  Both  arise  from  the  question  whether  their  concept  of 
wealth  is really  a driving  determinant of  consumption.  First, there is 
the issue  of  timing.  The bulk of the decline  in saving  is attributed to 
the  change  in  the  generational  account,  but that change  was  largely 
completed  during the  1960s or early  1970s-the  introduction of medi- 
care and medicaid,  and the expansion  of  social  security benefits.  Yet 
the national saving rate did not begin to decline until the 1980s. Second, 
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the authors' regression  analysis  produces no evidence  that changes  in 
the future component of wealth affect consumption; yet in their decom- 
position the transfer from unborn generations to the currently living  is 
the bulk of the story. While I agree with their recitation of the problems 
involving  such a regression analysis,  a positive  association  would have 
been very powerful  support for the basic  story.  We still  have no evi- 
dence that the generational account is relevant to explaining  household 
consumption  decisions. 
Furthermore, the value of factoring the consumption-to-income  ratio 
into ratios of consumption  to wealth and wealth to income would have 
been greatly enhanced if the consumption-to-wealth  ratio was found to 
be more stable over time than the consumption-to-income  ratio. In fact, 
the two ratios seem equally unstable and difficult to explain. They could 
have obtained a very similar story by simply  adding medical care and 
imputed rent to the standard consumption-income  survey. 
One important contribution of this paper lies in highlighting  the role 
of the medical programs. How should one treat medical care when it is 
provided  on  demand,  at near-zero  cost  to  the  recipient?  Is  it  really 
"'consumption"  if  the elderly  are not free  to reallocate  the funds  to 
other forms of consumption?  In a standard consumption-income  anal- 
ysis,  the payments  would  be added to both the numerator and the de- 
nominator, producing very little effect on the overall ratio of consump- 
tion  to  income.  In  switching  to  a consumption-resources  concept, 
however,  one  needs  to  know  if  the ratio of  the capitalized  value  of 
future medicare  payments  to current medicare payments  is  similar to 
that for other forms  of  income  received  by the elderly.  Furthermore, 
what about the counterfactual case? What would have happened to the 
spending  of  the  elderly  on health care and other consumption  if  the 
medicare program had not been created? 
Finally,  the authors raise a very interesting issue about the increased 
annuitization  of  wealth  as a possible  source of  the decline  in saving. 
They show a very large rise in the annuitized proportion of their wealth 
concept.  That is largely  due to the expanded role of medicare,  rather 
than an increased tendency  to convert private wealth to annuities. 
In summary,  this paper makes  a substantial contribution by docu- 
menting the extent of the shift in consumption  and resources from the 
young  and unborn to the aged.  I am less  convinced  that it provides  a 
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Robert  Haveman:  Gokhale,  Kotlikoff,  and Sabelhaus  present  a na- 
tional  accounts-based,  life  cycle  framework for decomposing  the de- 
cline  in U.S.  household  saving  (defined such that net national saving 
equals NNP less consumption less government exhaustive expenditure) 
into a set of factors defined as "determinants"  of household consump- 
tion  spending  (and hence,  household  saving).  Their analysis  is  both 
provocative  and enlightening.  I concentrate on the decomposition  anal- 
ysis  that underlies their primary policy  conclusion. 
The following  equation forms the basis for their decomposition  cal- 
culations: 
C,/Yt =  [1(cit1rit)(rjt1rt)(Pjt1Pt)]  R,lY, 
where C,,  Yt, R,,  and P, are aggregate consumption,  net national prod- 
uct,  "resources,"  and population,  respectively,  in year t; and ci, and 
ri, are the per capita components of the corresponding aggregate values, 
in which  i designates  the cohort.  It is  important to note the resource 
variables in this equation,  r, and ri,, at the outset; resources are defined 
as the present value of all remaining lifetime  assets or income  flows. 
Given this framework, the change in the national saving level can be 
decomposed  with period-specific  information on four variables: the dis- 
counted  present value  of  each  cohort's  remaining  lifetime  resources, 
ri,; the level  of consumption of each cohort, ci,; the size of each cohort, 
Pi,; and Y,. (Note  that the level  of  exhaustive  public  spending,  G,,  is 
subtracted from Y, in this definition  of  saving;  hence the level  of this 
component  of Y, must also be known.) 
With this information, responsibility  for the change in saving can be 
assigned  to the following  determinants: 
-change  in the age-cohort propensities  to consume  (ci,lri, =  cxj,); 
-change  in the relative  level  of resources available to each cohort 
(ri,/r,),  referred to as the "age-resource  profile"; 
-change  in the relative  size of each cohort (Pi,/P,);  and 
-change  in the ratio of  resources  to net national product (R,lY,), 
referred to as the "resources-to-output  ratio." 
The  authors use  this  accounting  framework,  with  the  appropriate 
estimated  time-  and cohort-specific  values,  to investigate  the effect  of 
intergenerational  resource  redistribution (IRR) on the national saving 
rate ([Y,  -  C,  -  G,]/[Y,  -  G,]).  IRR is characterized by changes  in 
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They ask, for example,  how changes in the distribution of resources 
among  age  cohorts  (ri,/r,)  from  young  to  old,  which  distribution  is 
clearly affected by governmental policy,  have caused the national sav- 
ing  rate to  change.  And,  how  redistribution  from  future to  current 
generations  (raising r,/Y,) has affected national saving.  They conclude 
that the decline  in national saving  is primarily due to these two com- 
ponents  of  IRR,  in particular,  the latter (in  combination  with  an in- 
creased  propensity  to  consume  out of  resources).  They  consider  the 
increases in social security,  medicare, and medicaid benefits, which are 
increasingly  annuitized and paid in kind,  as the underlying culprits in 
generating the measured changes  in both the age-resource  profile and 
the resources-to-output  ratio. 
The  clue  to  understanding  both  the  authors'  procedure  and their 
conclusion  is their concept  of  "cohort resources,"  defined as 
r=  nwi, +  hwi, +  pw,  -gai, 
where  nw  is  nonhuman  wealth,  hw is  human wealth,  pw  is  pension 
wealth,  and ga  is  the  "generational  account."  Within this equation, 
the definition and construction of gai,  is the central issue. 
The authors document  that these  cohort-specific  components  of re- 
sources  have  changed  remarkably over time.  For example,  for young 
cohorts,  the relative level  of hw/r has declined  substantially,  reflecting 
the  secular  downward  trend in  the  ratio of  the  earnings  of  younger 
relative to older workers. Similarly,  for older cohorts, the relative value 
of pw/r has risen,  reflecting the substantial growth in the level  of pen- 
sion assets. 
Much of the time-related action in these cohort-specific  components 
comes  in the generational  account term (gai,),  and it is shown in figure 
8 (see  also  table  14).  To understand what is happening in this figure, 
remember that the  generational  account  of  a particular cohort  is  the 
present value of the stream of net taxes (taxes less public transfers) for 
which its members are liable.  Hence the positive  values  in the figure, 
for example,  for young  cohorts,  represent net liabilities:  they are pro- 
jected to pay more in taxes than they will receive in transfers over their 
remaining  lifetime.  On the other hand,  the negative  values  for older 
cohorts  represent  net assets:  they  will  receive  more transfers during 
their remainng lifetime than they will pay in taxes. As the figure shows, 
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younger cohorts,  net tax liabilities  have fallen,  while for older cohorts, 
net transfers have risen. The increase in the net transfers to older cohorts 
is remarkable. It is largely this change that underlies the authors' fun- 
damental conclusion  that it is  "the  uncontrolled  intergenerational re- 
distribution from young  savers to old spenders"  that has been fueling 
ever lower rates of U.S.  saving. l 
Having identified  the secular fall in gaitlri,, especially  among older 
cohorts,  as a source of this central conclusion,  one can begin to inquire 
into  the  underlying  basis  for  the  estimated  change  in  gai,,  and  ask 
whether, in fact, consumption (saving) behavior is likely to be governed 
by the value of this component. 
To begin,  recall  what the cohort-specific  generational account rep- 
resents.  For any age group,  this dollar amount is the present value of 
the expected  stream of  tax liabilities  less  the present value of the ex- 
pected stream of public transfer income  (primarily, welfare,  social  se- 
curity retirement and disability,  medicare,  and medicaid benefits,  and 
food  stamps).  It is taken to represent the net present value (positive  or 
negative)  of  the burden of the public  sector on individuals  of  various 
ages,  including  those as yet unborn. 
In a long series of related papers, Auerbach, Gokhale,  and Kotlikoff 
have presented their estimates  of the generational account,  so defined. 
As  with many of  the values  necessary  for the estimates  in this paper, 
the construction of the generational account requires numerous conven- 
tions and assumptions,  many of which are arbitrary  and artificial. List- 
ing  a few  will  reiterate the fragility  of  such estimates  of  the cohort- 
specific  net fiscal burden: 
-The  structure of tax-transfer policy as it currently exists (including 
the relationship  between  aggregate  public  transfers and taxes,  which 
could  be  labeled  the  "net  tax-transfer deficit")  is  projected  into the 
indefinite future, as if future policy  would fail to respond to imbalances 
or changed circumstances.  The estimated generational account does not 
allow  for future economic  growth,  macroeconomic  changes  in policy, 
or microeconomic  changes  in labor supply,  bequests,  or population in 
response  to the presumed intergenerational imbalance.' 
1.  Note  that both the  numerator and the denominator of  gai,/ri, are determined  by 
the estimated  value of the generational  account. 
2.  Similarly,  the  observed  cohort  profile  of  labor  income  (that  is,  relative  age- 
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The burden of covering  both the shortfall in the present value of 
net taxes paid by generations  currently living  and the present value of 
the fiscal liabilities  generated by all future generations  is carried only 
by generations  as yet unborn; members of currently living  generations 
bear none of it. This is the main reason for the very large growth in net 
"benefits"  to older generations  (and the smaller reduction in net bur- 
dens borne by younger generations)  observed in figure 8.3 
-The  effect  of  public  nontransfer expenditures  (for example,  ex- 
haustive expenditure on public physical and human capital, farm policy, 
and environmental  regulation)  on young  and old cohorts is totally ex- 
cluded from the calculation of the generational account; hence the large 
and growing  public  expenditure  on education  and child care-expen- 
diture that accrues to young cohorts-is  ignored in the intergenerational 
pattern of the ga component  of cohort-specific  resources. 
-The  estimates  of  generational  imbalance assume that there is no 
behavioral response to fiscal measures-that  the estimated flow of dol- 
lars also reflects the ultimate disposition  of funds and the incidence  of 
the  burden  and  benefit  of  government  programs.  For example,  the 
growth of medicare and social  security retirement benefits is assigned 
only to the elderly; their adult children, who would otherwise have had 
to shoulder some of this burden, are assigned  no benefit. 
The estimate  of gai, depends on the choice  of the discount rate; the 
authors take it to be 6 percent,  but also provide estimates  based on 3 
and 9 percent. The conceptual basis of this rate is nowhere defined, and 
its empirical basis is opaque,  at best.4 
Given  these  concerns  regarding the reliability  of  this central com- 
ponent of  cohort resources,  the reasonableness  of  this concept  of  re- 
sources-which  serves  as  the  basic  force  driving  consumption  (and 
hence,  saving) decisions-is  not obvious.  This is especially  true given 
that several  of  the components  of  the authors' accounting  framework 
growth nor change  in the structure of  the economy  are allowed  to change  the shape of 
this profile in the future. 
3.  This  conclusion  would  be  clear  if  the  generational  account  for  unborn future 
generations  were  shown,  since  this  account  is  necessary  to  satisfy  the  present  value 
budget balance  constraint that is an essential  element  in the construction of the genera- 
tional accounts. 
4.  The discount  rate is described  as the "pretax real rate of return" and is defined 
as  [(net  worth less  income  from earnings  and pensions  pllus  the  sum of  consumption 
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are directly  determined  by  this  definition  of  cohort  resources.  From 
above,  note that the cohort-specific  propensities to consume,  the age- 
resource  profile,  and  the resources-to-output  ratio,  all  of  which  are 
period-specific,  are all directly  determined by the measure of  cohort 
resources.  And changes  in the value of this variable are dominated by 
changes  in the generational  account.  Is it reasonable to believe  that in 
a regime in which the current structure of policy remains fixed beyond 
the  limit  of  their  short-term projections,  individuals  base  their con- 
sumption decisions  on this arbitrarily defined and measured concept of 
resources  that both rests  on,  and secures  the bulk of  its time-related 
variation from, the estimation of the lifetime trajectories of the taxes to 
be paid and the transfers to be received  (that is, gai,)? 
The  above  discussion  suggests  that the  authors'  basic  conclusion 
regarding the cause of the decline  in national saving may be too facile. 
With their decomposition  procedure, those components that are corre- 
lated with the variable whose  time trend is being analyzed  (aggregate 
saving)  will  be assigned  the primary causal responsibility  for the ob- 
served trend in this variable.  In this exercise,  the central causal com- 
ponent is IRR,  in the form of both ri,/r, (the age-resource  profile) and 
R,lY, (the resources-to-output  ratio).  And in turn, the time-related pat- 
terns of both these components  are dominated by the measured trends 
in gai,.  Given  the arbitrary nature of  this concept  of  the generational 
account and its measurement, I remain a skeptic as to their conclusion. 
In addition  to the potential  problems  with the definition  of  cohort 
resources that drives the calculation,  the framework for decomposition 
has questionable  characteristics.  In essence,  the authors' procedure is 
akin to  what has  been  referred to  as  "shift-share"  analysis  in other 
contexts.  It requires simulating  changes  in one of the variables while 
holding  constant  the others.  Because  most  of  the components  of  the 
decomposition  exercise  are dependent  on  the  estimate  of  cohort  re- 
sources,  ri,, if one component  is changed,  the others cannot be fixed. 
For example,  given  their definitions,  if the resources  of  the aged are 
increased,  the  consumption  propensity  profile,  ci,lri,  =  a,,  and the 
resources-to-output  ratio, R,lY,, must also  change.  If this is so,  what 
interpretation can be placed on the counterfactual simulation exercises 
on which their conclusions  rest?5 
5.  Perhaps  this  interdependence  lies  behind  a  puzzling  pattern in  the  estimates. Gokhale, Kotlikoff,  and Sabelhaus  401 
I have a couple  of  additional puzzles  to be addressed.  First,  when 
the ratio of  consumption  to resources  (the average propensity to con- 
sume out of resources)  has grown so little over the thirty-year period 
(excepting  for the very oldest  cohorts),  how can it account for such a 
large share of the decline  in the saving rate-from  about one-third to 
one-half  (at the 6 percent discount rate, see table 8)? Is it conceivable 
that changes  in the  average  propensity  to consume  of  this  relatively 
small  group alone  could  account for such a large share of the decline 
in the saving  rate? Second,  to what extent does  the allocation  of  100 
percent  of  medical  care  expenditure  to  consumption  (as  opposed  to 
investment in health capital) drive the authors' result? How would their 
conclusions  regarding the magnitude of the decline in the saving rate- 
and the allocation  of this decline  to its various components-change, 
for example,  if one-half  of  the increase  in medical  care services  was 
defined as contributions to health capital (and hence,  saving)  and one- 
half to consumption;  or,  if such expenditure was defined as saving  or 
investment for individuals less than fifty years old, but as consumption 
for older citizens? 
One final thought: although they describe their framework as deriving 
from  the  life  cycle  model,  the  assumptions  necessary  to  make  this 
linkage-no  uncertainty and smoothly  functioning  annuity markets- 
make the claim less than convincing.  Moreover, these assumptions are 
required to obtain their empirical measure of cohort-specific  resources, 
ri,, which,  as I emphasize  above,  is central to their analysis. 
These  concerns  and puzzles  notwithstanding,  I stand in admiration 
of the empirical  effort  that this paper represents.  It is a tour de force 
in terms of  data assembly  and analysis,  and in its tracing of  NIPA- 
consistent time trends. The authors' analysis of these trends, apart from 
the decomposition  analysis,  does support several of their basic conclu- 
sions.  For example,  if  medical  care  services  represent consumption, 
the increasing  consumption  propensity of the elderly seems  indisputa- 
ble,  and the contributions  of both medicare and social  security retire- 
Referring to table 7,  the authors state that if the ratio of resources to output in 1960-61 
had prevailed  in  1987-90,  saving  rates would  have been 75  percent larger. Yet  in the 
lower bank of  that table,  the underlying  ratio of  resources to output is shown  to have 
risen from  12.53  to  12.96  over this period,  an increase of 0.43,  or about 3 percent. It is 
not clear  how  such  a small  change  in this  component  of  IRR could  generate  such  an 
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ment benefits to consumption,  so defined,  are clear from their series. 
And it is quite plausible that this increase in spending propensity stems 
from the fact that these benefits are either annuitized or paid in kind. It 
is  less  clear  whether  this  increase  in consumption  by  the  elderly  is 
attributable to  "the  government's  redistribution of  resources  toward 
older generations,"  or whether, whatever its source,  it can explain the 
bulk of the decline  in national saving. 
General  discussion:  Several participants commented on the degree to 
which resources of the elderly have become  annuitized,  and the impli- 
cation  of  annuitzation  for saving.  Social  security benefits  represent a 
much  larger proportion  of  U.S.  personal  income  today  than  in  the 
1960s,  and the role of medicare in providing medical coverage  for the 
elderly  has substantially  expanded.  While  some thought that the trend 
toward  annuitized  wealth  is  responsible  for  increasing  consumption 
propensities  among the elderly,  others suggested that the private sector 
might provide the same sorts of  annuities in the absence of programs 
like  social  security.  Therefore  they  concluded  that the role of  social 
security and medicare in contributing to the elderly's  spending rate is 
ambiguous.  Still others,  while believing  that social  security and medi- 
care have had a negative impact on national saving,  questioned whether 
the higher saving rate that would occur in the absence of these programs 
would represent a welfare  improvement. 
Charles Schultze  noted that the impact of social  security and medi- 
care on  national  saving  depends  crucially  on the alternative to  these 
programs.  He  suggested  that the  most  likely  response  of  economic 
agents to the absence of government-provided  longevity  insurance and 
old age health care would be some combination of risk pooling,  changed 
savings  behavior,  and increased reliance on adult children in old age. 
He concluded that the effect on national saving of eliminating the social 
security and medicare programs is therefore ambiguous. William Dick- 
ens agreed, observing that the growth in medicare reflects, in large part, 
the demand for new  medical  technology  that, in the absence of medi- 
care,  would  most likely  have been provided by some form of old age 
health  insurance.  Household  saving  behavior  in that situation  would 
probably not differ greatly from what is observed.  He speculated  that 
employers  would  probably offer this kind of health insurance to their 
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Kotlikoff  expressed  reservations  about these  arguments,  noting  that 
evidence  in favor  of  intergenerational  altruism  is  very  weak,  which 
suggests  that the  level  of  support for  the  elderly  in  the  absence  of 
government-run  programs would  be  substantially  less  than it  is  cur- 
rently.  Kotlikoff  pointed out that firms that try to finance health insur- 
ance on a pay-as-you-go  basis  will  see  their stock values  decline,  so 
there is no net wealth  effect,  and thus no stimulus  to aggregate  con- 
sumption as would arise under unfunded social security. Matthew Shap- 
iro  suggested  that the  elderly  do  not  value  a dollar  in the  form  of 
medicare  as  much  as  a dollar  in cash  from  social  security  or other 
sources.  As a consequence,  medicare may be one of the reasons behind 
the high  measured consumption  propensities  of the elderly,  and their 
high spending rates raise questions  about the efficacy  of the medicare 
program. 
James  Tobin  thought  it  likely  that the  increased  annuitization  of 
wealth  among  the  elderly  does,  in fact,  reduce  national  saving  and 
thereby might be affecting  capital formation.  However,  he questioned 
the wisdom  of  trying to raise national saving  by abandoning govern- 
ment-run longevity  insurance because the resulting increase in national 
saving would not be welfare improving.  Unless  there are other, offset- 
ting reasons for undersaving, the abandonment of such insurance would 
lead to excess  capital formation.  Tobin noted that when insurance can 
take the place of capital formation, the outcome can represent a welfare 
improvement.  Conversely,  abandoning social security to raise national 
saving  is questionable  on efficiency  grounds.  Gregory Mankiw noted 
that Tobin's  analysis  holds  for a first-best world without distortions, 
but observed  that in a second-best  world with capital income taxation, 
there is probably too little capital. Under these circumstances,  longevity 
insurance would reduce saving further and exacerbate the existing  dis- 
tortion. Kotlikoff  responded that he was not concerned with the effects 
of longevity  insurance per se,  but rather with the pay-as-you-go  nature 
of the social  security program that transfers resources from the young 
to the old.  Further, he noted that this approach to longevity  insurance 
clearly  depresses  national  saving,  and that politicians  should be cog- 
nizant of  this  fact.  Kotlikoff  proposed  tax reform as  a way  to  raise 
national saving  under the current social  security system. 
A number of speakers discussed the role of imperfections in annuities 
markets and their possible  repercussions  for the bequest motive.  Ben- 404  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1.1996 
jamin  Friedman noted that imperfections  in annuities  markets are,  in 
fact,  severe.  He reported that the pricing of nongroup annuities in the 
United States, as opposed to annuities bought through corporate pension 
plans,  have loads on the order of  30 percent,  even  from the best pro- 
viders.  He concluded  that the imperfections  in the single-life  annuities 
market in the United States are considerable.  In addition to high loads 
for the population (hat buys annuities, he believed that adverse selection 
problems are substantial, noting that the subpopulation that buys single- 
life  annuities  has very  different  mortality  schedules  than the general 
population.  Kotlikoff  concurred,  explaining  that data on bequests  in- 
dicate  that a large fraction  of  these  transfers are made involuntarily, 
because  large  insurance  premiums  make  it  impossible  for  people  to 
annuitize their wealth.  Tobin remarked that the effects  of market im- 
perfections  in annuitization  would  be exacerbated  if agents were risk 
averse,  increasing the size  of involuntary bequests. 
Mankiw  was  critical  of  Kotlikoff's  view  that bequests  are mostly 
accidental  and that intergenerational  altruism is  weak.  He noted that 
under these circumstances,  the only way to explain observed bequests 
is to assume  that annuities  markets are highly  imperfect,  so that eco- 
nomic  agents  cannot  annuitize  their wealth.  While  he conceded  that 
high  insurance  premiums  in  annuities  markets are likely  because  of 
adverse selection  problems,  he observed that estate planning attorneys 
prosper precisely  because people care about leaving bequests.  Mankiw 
suggested that the analysis should distinguish between the wealthy, who 
have access  to sophisticated  legal  and financial advice,  and the rest of 
the population.  In his view  the wealthy,  who control most of the na- 
tion's  wealth,  leave  largely  voluntary bequests,  while  the rest of  the 
population  makes involuntary bequests  as a result of imperfections  in 
the annuities  market.  He concluded  that taking account  of  these  two 
tiers would provide a more satisfactory explanation of intergenerational 
transfer. 
A number of participants thought that measurement error might be 
to blame for the high estimates  of the consumption propensities  of the 
elderly,  although Kotlikoff  did not. Friedman observed that one of the 
most interesting  trends over the last two generations  has been the in- 
crease in the number of retired people  who live  independently,  rather 
than with their adult children.  He noted that the authors treat the ex- Gokhale. Kotlikoff.  and Sabelhaus  405 
penses  of  living  alone  strictly  as consumption  by the retired elderly, 
although it is apparent that today's adult working population values the 
independence of their elderly parents. John Helliwell  suggested that the 
elderly's  consumption might be overestimated because a larger propor- 
tion of their consumption  on housing  consists  of  imputed rents based 
on the market value of houses,  which are themselves  inaccurately mea- 
sured. He suggested  that insofar as imputed rent is responsible  for the 
high spending rate of the elderly,  it appears less  alarming. 
Robert Hall  was  concerned  that too  much importance is placed  on 
the fall in national saving,  warning that the link between national saving 
and the U.S.  capital  stock  is  tenuous.  He explained  that in a simple 
Tobin-style  model of the life cycle,  the effect of a reduction in national 
saving on capital formation would depend on the degree of international 
capital mobility  and on agents' elasticity  of intertemporal substitution, 
both of  which  affect  the slope  of the supply of funds schedule.  In the 
extreme case  of perfect capital mobility,  and under the small country 
assumption,  the  supply  of  funds  schedule  is  horizontal  at the  world 
interest rate, so that a decline in national saving shifts ownership of the 
capital stock away from domestic citizens  and toward foreigners,  while 
leaving  the size  of the capital stock unchanged.  He conceded  that the 
small  country  assumption  is  unrealistic,  given  that the United  States 
constitutes about a third of the world's wealth, but nonetheless  believed 
that this example demonstrates that a reduction in U.S.  national saving 
need not have a substantial impact on U. S. capital formation. However, 
Kotlikoff  noted that national saving  is of prime importance for future 
national saving. 
Edmund Phelps  thought that the decline  in national saving  can be 
motivated  by an unexpected  productivity  slowdown  during the  1970s 
and  1980s.  He  argued that during that period economic  agents  were 
repeatedly  surprised by negative  productivity  shocks,  and as a result, 
were saving too much in relation to their realized incomes.  With time, 
their nonhuman wealth  became  large relative  to their human wealth, 
and economic  agents  started to spend down excess  nonhuman wealth 
because  the excess  was  inconsistent  with their expectations  of  future 
income.  Phelps  concluded  that the  decline  in  saving  rates is  due  to 
people  trying to return to their optimal ratio of  nonhuman to human 
wealth. 406  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1996 
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